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An Empirical Analysis of Alcohol Addiction
by
Ismail Sirtalan 
Adviser: Professor Michael Grossman
This study is an empirical application of the rational addiction theory to the 
consumption of alcohol and heavy drinking. The model, developed by Becker 
and Murphy, emphasizes the interdependency of past, current and future 
consumption of an addictive good. This is different than myopic addiction 
models where the current consumption is dependent on past consumption bu t 
not on future consumption. The data employed is the Monitoring the Future 
Survey, a panel representative of young adults between seventeen and twenty 
seven years old, over a period of fourteen years from 1976 to 1989. Since alcohol 
abuse is m ost prevalent in this age group with significant adverse effects, this 
sample may be a more relevant choice than a representative sample of all ages.
c
Because of the endogenous nature of the past and future consumption, two stage 
least squares method is used to estimate alcohol demand function. I find that the 
consumption of alcohol is addictive in the sense that increases in past or future 
consumption cause the current consumption to rise. Since the coefficient on the 
future consumption is positive and significant, the rational addiction model is 
more appropriate than the myopic addiction model. The long-run elasticity of 
consumption with respect to price of beer is larger than the short-run elasticity, 
which is expected in the context of the rational addiction theory.
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In their 1988 paper, Becker and M urphy develop a model of addictive behavior 
where individuals behave rationally. Like the other addictive behavior models, 
their model assumes that an increase in past consumption of an addictive good 
increases the current consumption. The contribution of Becker-Murphy model to 
the addiction literature is that addicts are rational in the sense that they act 
according to the expected future consequences of their current actions. This is 
quite different from the myopic type of addiction models where the individual 
optimizes h is/her utility without considering the effects of current consumption 
on the future utility.
W ith the assumption of rational behavior, current, past and future consumption 
of an addictive good becomes interdependent. Therefore, an increase in the past 
consumption, as well as an increase in the future consumption will cause the 
current consumption to rise. Since the consumption of a good is negatively 
related to its price, a price reduction in future (perhaps because of an expected 
tax break) will increase future consumption, which in turn  will increase current 
marginal utility of that good (hence its consumption). Note that by symmetry, 
the effect of a change in the past price will be in the same direction as the one 
resulting from a change in the future price.
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Another prediction of the rational addiction is a larger long-run own price 
elasticity than the short-run own price elasticity. The long-run, in this context, 
means that the past consumption is allowed to vary while short-run elasticity is 
calculated by keeping the past consumption fixed. This prediction of the model 
has im portant policy implications. If one computes a price elasticity based only 
on the current consumption of an  addictive good then the future consumption 
predictions of this good will not be correct.
Alcohol and cigarette consumption are good candidates for addictive behavior. 
They are also important policy variables both in terms of health consequences 
and tax revenue purposes. If, for example, the addicts are rational, a tax hike on 
these goods will decrease the future consumption more than w hat would be 
predicted when the calculation is based on the short-run elasticity. 
Consequently, governments may not achieve certain policy goals (e.g., financing 
of health care reform or funding of rehabilitation programs for addicts through 




II. A. M yopic Models of Addiction
Interest in addictive behavior by economists dates to Alfred Marshall. W riting in 
1920, he noted: "Whether a commodity conforms to the law of diminishing or 
increasing return, the increase in consumption arising from a fall in price is 
gradual; and, further, habits which have once grown up around the use of a 
commodity while its price is low me not quickly abandoned when its price rises 
again" (Marshall 1920, p. 807). Most economists who have studied this behavior 
since Marshall have assumed myopia or imperfectly rational behavior. There are 
two types of models that can be classified under this topic: One type of model 
deals w ith consumers who ignore the effects of current consumption on future 
utility when they determine the optimal quantity of an addictive good in the 
current period. In these models, past consumption affects current consumption 
through an accumulated stock of habits (for example, Houthakker and Taylor 
1970; Poliak 1970,1976; von Weizsacker 1971; El-Safty 1976; Hammond 1976). In 
the second class of models, consumers have stable but inconsistent short-run and 
long-run preferences (for example, Schelling 1978, 1984a, 1984b; Elster 1979; 
W inston 1980; Thaler and Shefrin 1981).
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Excellent reviews of the literature on myopic models of addiction are contained 
in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Phlips (1983), Iannaccone (1984), and 
Chaloupka (1988) provide extensive reviews of myopic addiction models. 
Instead of the models, their empirical applications are reviewed here.
Houthakker and Taylor (1970) argue that if a commodity is non-durable, its stock 
should have a positive impact on its current consumption in the presence of habit 
formation. If it is durable, a negative stock effect is possible due to inventory 
adjustment (there is negative effect if there is no addiction). Houthakker and 
Taylor fit dynamic time-series demand functions for the United States and 
several countries in Western Europe using non-additive and additive 
specifications and find considerable support for habit formation. Structural stock 
coefficients, which are retrieved from coefficients of lagged consumption and 
other lagged variables, are positive for almost all non-durable goods. In the U.S., 
among the coefficients of 81 goods for the period 1929-1964, the stock coefficient 
of alcoholic beverages ranks eight with a value of 1.1 and the stock coefficient of 
cigarettes is tenth w ith a coefficient of 0.9. Phlips (1972,1978), uses a somewhat 
refined version of the Houthakker-Taylor model, and reports that U.S. time- 
series data is dominated by habit formation.1
1 In his study alcohol and cigarettes are not treated as separate consumption 
items.
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Other researchers have applied variants of the Houthakker-Taylor model to the 
demand for alcohol and cigarettes in the United Kingdom and Australia. 
Kennedy et al. (1973) and Thom (1984) find evidence of habit formation in their 
estimates of the demand for beer, wine, and distilled spirits in Ireland. Duffy 
(1980), however, finds no support of the Houthakker-Taylor habit formation 
hypothesis in beer, wine, and spirits demand equations for the United Kingdom 
as a whole. Tsolakis et al. (1983) report that the model is compatible with 
Australian wine consumption but not beer consumption. Jones (1989) reports 
that a habit model outperforms a non-habit model in the case of beer for the U.K 
but not in the case of spirits, wine, and cigarettes.
Studies by Grabowski (1976), Johnson and Oksanen (1977), and Baltagi and Levin 
(1986) are somewhat more flexible and their data requirements are less 
dem anding than the specifications required to fit the Houthakker-Taylor model. 
They use lagged alcohol and cigarette consumption effects in estimating the 
demand functions. Grabowski (1976) obtains demand functions for fifteen goods 
including alcoholic beverages but excluding cigarettes using 1956-1972 data for 
the United States. In various alternative specifications, he finds that the past 
alcohol consumption coefficient is always positive and statistically significant. 
His coefficient estimates range between 0.5 and 0.7 and typically is the second or 
third largest lagged effect. Johnson and Oksanen (1977) fit demand functions for
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beer, wine, and spirits in Canada. They use time-series data of province cross 
sections for the period of 1956-1970. They too report positive past consumption 
coefficients for each beverage, statistically significant for spirits and wine. The 
coefficient on wine is approximately 0.5, the spirits coefficient is 0.3, and the beer 
coefficient is 0.1. Baltagi and Levin (1986) report a lagged consumption 
coefficient of 0.9 for cigarette demand functions. Their data set consist of a time- 
series of state cross sections for the period 1964-1980 in United States.
All of the studies described so far treat lagged consumption or the stock as 
predetermined, because they all assume myopic behavior on the part of the 
consumer. Even if this exogenous treatment of the past consumption is 
appropriate, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased and 
inconsistent in the presence of serial correlation. Some of the studies attem pt to 
correct for serial correlation, but there may still be a bias if there is 
misspecification in the process. The alcohol demand studies by Thom (1984) and 
Jones (1989) had to deal with very complex empirical specifications as a result of 
combining Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) Almost Ideal Demand System and 
the Houthakker-Taylor model. Moreover, the functional forms and estimation 
m ethods used by Houthakker and Taylor (1970) and by Phlips (1972,1978) are 
more complicated than the procedures used by Becker et al. (1994).
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A final criticism of myopic studies of addiction is related to the role of 
advertising in the demand function. Berndt (1991) discusses several econometric 
problems in estimating the effects of advertisement on demand functions. As 
indicated by Saffer (1993), if advertising is treated as a stock, then a series of 
lagged advertising variables will affect current consumption. When these effects 
are modeled as a Koyck process, then the coefficient of past consumption will 
reflect both the effect of habit formation and the effect of advertising.
Empirical studies discussed so far focus on the impact of past consumption on 
current consumption. Myopic studies by Young and by Pekuurinen have a 
different emphasis. Young (1983) studies the demand for cigarettes in the United 
States and Pekuurinen (1989) in Finland, attempting to implement Scitovsky's 
(1976) notion that consumers should respond more to price decreases than to 
price increases in the case of addictive goods. They present empirical evidence in 
support of this proposition, nevertheless, there is no formal model that contains a 
proof of it. Moreover, both studies neglect any effects of past consumption on 
current consumption. In addition, their observations may be the result of 
intertemporal interactions of past, current and future prices on the demand for 
addictive goods which is the topic of this paper. Becker and M urphy's (1988) 
treatm ent of unstable steady states does not preclude asymmetric price responses
8
in aggregate data, although the response to a price reduction is not necessarily 
larger than the response to a price increase.
II. B. Rational Models of Addiction
Addictive behaviors, the most obvious examples of which are cigarette smoking, 
consumption of illegal drugs and excessive alcohol use, have been the subject of 
num erous research and many economic models in the past and continues to be 
so. Grossman (1993, p. 91) takes the view that since "lifestyles play a more 
im portant role in health outcomes than medical care... policy-makers would be 
interested in empirical evidence of behaviors with regard to their sensitivity to 
price — a policy-manipulable variable in light of excise taxes — and other 
Government regulations such as the minimum legal drinking age for the 
purchase and consumption of alcoholic beverages."
His first studies deal w ith the effects of cigarette prices on smoking and the 
effects of alcohol prices on alcohol use in micro data. Gary Becker, Michael 
Grossman and Kevin M urphy tested empirically the theory of rational addiction 
in the well-known paper (Becker et a l 1991a, 1994)2 which pertains to cigarette 
addiction in time series of state cross sections in the United States. This paper
2 Becker et a l 1991a is the earlier version of 1994 paper.
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was followed by a second paper containing some theoretical extensions of the 
rational addiction model (Becker et al. 1991b) and a third project dealing w ith 
alcohol, addiction, and price (Grossman et al. 1995). Finally, he estimates 
dem and functions for cocaine consumption by young adults (Grossman et al. 
1996).
The empirical research using a rational addiction framework is new compared to 
the empirical research using a myopic addiction framework. In order to 
determine the optimal quantity of an addictive good, the consumers of the 
rational models of addiction consider the future effects of the current 
consumption. However, the consumers of the myopic models ignore the effects 
of current consumption on future utility.
Im portant theoretical contributions to the rational models of addiction have been 
m ade by Ryder and Heal (1973), Boyer (1978, 1983) and Kydland and Prescott 
(1982). All of these authors deal w ith optimal path of consumption over time 
w hen the utility function is not additively separable.3 Using these models as the 
starting point, Becker and M urphy (1988) developed a specific model of rational 
addiction that contains the first explicit derivation of long-run and short-run 
dem and functions for addictive goods in the case of farsighted consumers. The
3 See Iannaccone (1984) and Chaloupka (1988) for in depth review of these 
models.
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main contribution of their model of rational addiction is to indicate that it is 
incorrect to assume that addictive goods are not sensitive to price.
Becker and M urphy (1988) assume that consumers maximize a lifetime utility 
function which is separable over time and the quantity demanded of the 
addictive good is inversely related to the current, past and future prices of the 
good. Past prices affect past consumption of the addictive goods and an increase 
in past consumption raises current consumption. On the other hand, a decrease 
in future prices lowers the shadow price of current consumption, raising the 
current consumption. In other words, increases in past or future consumption 
cause current consumption to rise. Along the same lines, a long-run response to 
the price change of an addictive good is larger — in absolute value — than the 
short-run response. Since this model constitutes the theoretical framework of 
this study, I leave the detailed explanation to Section III.
In their 1991b paper, Becker et al. develop some theoretical extensions to the 
rational addiction model. They note that the total cost of an addictive good 
equals the sum  of good's price and the money value of its future adverse effects. 
The negative effects of excessive alcohol consumption on earnings is an example 
to future adverse effects. They also note that the future costs tend to be less 
im portant to poorer, less educated and younger consumers because they 
generally place a smaller monetary value on health and other harmful future
11
effects than richer, more educated and adult consumers who have higher wage 
rates. Finally, the poor, youths and less educated are more likely to have lower 
time-discount factors (they value present substantially more than the future) 
compared to rich, adults, and the more educated. Therefore poor, young and 
less educated are more sensitive to changes in money prices of addictive goods 
then the upper or middle income class, adults and more educated who are more 
sensitive to perceived or actual harmful consequences that they expect to occur 
in the future.
An im portant contribution of Becker and Murphy (1988) pertains to their 
treatm ent of rational addiction in the context of unstable steady states. In an 
unstable state, a price change causes people to start or stop using an addictive 
good or to change their consumption of the addictive good drastically. They 
show that unstable steady states are possible in their rational addiction model. 
Decisions to start or stop the consumption of an addictive good can be studied 
within this framework. Besides prices, stressful life events like divorce affect 
such a decision. Becker-Murphy model also implies that the probability of 
consuming an addictive good in the current period and the current consumption 
quantity will rise if a change in status from married to divorced or unemployed 
to employed is anticipated in the near future.
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Other contributions to the literature on the theory of rational addiction are by 
Barthold and Hochman (1988) and Michaels (1988). Barthold and Hochman 
predict that free inpatient treatment programs would be more successful than 
outpatient treatment. Michaels proposes that anti-drinking campaigns that 
promote the productivity of activities other than alcohol abuse would be more 
successful than campaigns that stresses only on the negative effects of alcohol 
abuse.
II.B.1. Empirical Applications of Rational Addiction Models: D em and 
for Cigarettes/ Gam bling and Leisure Time
Becker et a l (1994) fit models of rational addiction to cigarettes in a U.S. time 
series of state cross sections for the period 1955-1985. They focus on the simple 
model in which the rate of depreciation on the addictive stock equals one (see 
equation [4]), which is also the focus of this study.4 They fit structural demand 
functions using two-stage least squares method where past and future 
consumption are treated as endogenous variables and past and future cigarette 
prices as instruments.5 They also use current, past, and future state cigarette
4 In an earlier version of the paper (Becker et al. 1991a), they also estimate the 
general model where the depreciation rate is less than one (see footnote 12 
and 15).
5 Grossman (1993) explains that they treat the cigarette price as exogenous 
even though the cigarette industry is highly concentrated in the United 
States. He justifies this based on the work of Sumner (1981, p. 1017), who
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excise tax rates as instruments in some specifications, because consumers may 
have more information about taxes, especially future taxes, than about future 
prices.
They find that, the two-stage least squares estimates of current price, and past 
and future consumption coefficients are all statistically significant. Furthermore, 
as their model predicts (see Section III, page 28), price coefficient is negative, 
while the coefficients on lead and lagged consumption variables are positive, 
indicating that cigarette smoking is addictive and that consumers are rational 
rather than myopic. They calculate that the long-run price elasticity of demand 
is between -0.73 and -0.79, which is about twice as large as the short-run price 
elasticity which is between -0.36 and -0.41. Again, as predicted, there appears to 
be intertemporal complementarity between cigarette consumption at various 
points in time: cigarette consumption in any year is lower when both future 
prices and past prices are higher.
One problem they note about the coefficient estimates is that the point estimates 
of the discount factor ft  are very low — the ratio of the coefficient of future
concludes that "the effect of monopoly power as a source of price variation 
in the [cigarette] industry is small compared w ith tax rate differences and 
other cost differences over time and space." Also, Porter (1986) does not find 
m uch difference between cigarette market demand functions that treat price 
as exogenous and demand functions that treat price as endogenous.
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consumption to the coefficient of past consumption. They range from 0.31 to 0.64 
which correspond to interest rates ranging from 56.3 percent to 222.6 percent. 
They attribute these high interest rates to uncertainty about the future prices on 
the part of consumer: Since they can not fully anticipate the future prices, 
estimates based on the assumption of perfect foresight may overstate the 
variability of expected future prices. Due to an errors-in-variables bias, this may 
lead to an understatem ent of the effect of future prices on current consumption.
In an alternative specification, they exclude the future price and taxes from the 
instrum ent set to explore the preceding issue. Under this specification, they 
obtain substantially different coefficient estimates from the ones that include 
these variables as instruments. While these estimates still have the correct signs 
to support the rational addiction model the results reject the hypothesis that 
future prices and taxes are inappropriate instruments.
As mentioned above, Becker et al. (1994) obtain very low discount rates which 
they attribute to the aggregate nature of their data set.6 Therefore they specify 
new models where six alternative discount factors ranging from 0.70 to 0.95 
(interest rates ranging from 5.3 percent to 42.9 percent) are imposed on the
i
6 Other studies too indicate considerable variation in the estimates of 
consumer discount factors (Hansen and Singleton 1983, Mankiw et al. 1985, 
Hotz et al. 1988, Bover 1991, Epstein and Zin 1991).
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coefficient of the future consumption. They obtain long-run and short-run price 
elasticities that are very similar to the ones obtained without such constraints 
regardless of the discount factor imposed. The imposed discount factors are 
statistically significant in most specifications where the future prices and taxes 
are used as instruments whereas they are not significant in specifications where 
the instruments do not include lead prices and taxes. This provides further 
support to their original specification.
Further evidence in support of the rational model of cigarette addiction is 
obtained by Chaloupka (1991). Using cigarette consumption measures in three 
adjacent periods from the second National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey, which is a micro data set, he estimates cigarette demand functions 
similar to those in Becker et al. (1994). His estimates of future and past 
consumption coefficients are positive and significant. He reports a short-run 
price elasticity (-0.20) that is less than one-half of the long-run price elasticity of 
-0.45. He also finds that the less educated is more sensitive to changes in 
cigarette prices than the more educated, a prediction m ade by Becker et al. 
(1991 b). A similar result was obtained by Townsend (1987) w ith British data. 
Lewit et al. (1981) and Lewit and Coate (1982) report that youths respond more to 
cigarette prices than adults. Using U.S. data, Farrell and Fuchs (1982) find that 
increasing awareness of the long-run harmful effects of smoking since 1960's,
16
had greater effect on smoking by rich and more educated than by poor and less 
educated. Townsend (1987) replicates these results for Britain. Note that 
Wasserman et al. (1991) fail to replicate the interaction between age and price in 
the dem and for cigarettes using various National Health Interview Surveys in 
the 1970's and 1980's.
Keeler et al. (1993) regress cigarette consumption on the current price, three lags 
of the price, and three leads of the price in a monthly time-series study of the 
demand for cigarettes in California during the period 1980-1990. Their results 
too confirm the rational addiction model. However, their estimates are not based 
on the structural form used by Becker et al. (1994). As explained in Section III, 
future and past prices have direct effects on future and past consumption, and 
they only indirectly affect current consumption when the current price is held 
fixed. In this context, future and past prices will negatively affect the current 
consumption of rational addicts. Keeler et al. report, however, positive and 
insignificant past and future price coefficients. This result may be due to the fact 
that there are too many leads and lags included in the regression equations and 
to multicollinearity among monthly time-series of prices for a single state.
Mobilia (1990) applies the rational addiction framework to the demand for 
gambling at horse racing tracks. Her data consist of a U.S. time series of horse 
track cross sections for the period from 1950 through 1986 (tracks over time are
17
the units of observation). She measures consumption by the real amount bet per 
attendant (handle per attendant) and price by the takeout rate (the fraction of the 
total am ount bet that is retained by the track). Her findings are similar to those 
in the rational addictive studies of cigarettes by Becker et al. (1994), and 
Chaloupka (1991). The long-run price elasticity of demand for gambling at horse 
tracks equals -0.7 and is more than twice as large as the short-run elasticity of 
-0.3. Moreover, an increase in the current takeout rate lowers handle per 
attendant in past and future years.
In an alternative specification, Mobilia considers attendance, per capita as a 
dependent variable. This specification does not support the rational addiction 
model. Since her data indicate that eighty percent of all bets are placed by only 
twenty percent of the attendees, it is clear that gambling is addictive only for a 
smaller portion of attendees, the rest of them attend for entertainment purposes. 
Therefore, handle per attendant is a much better measure of addiction to 
gambling than attendance per capita.
Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics of the University of Michigan, Hotz et 
al.(1988) and Bover (1991) apply variants of rational addiction models to the 
dem and for leisure time or the supply of hours of work over the life cycle. Both 
report evidence of rational addiction in the sense that current hours of work are 
positively related to past and future hours of work.
18
Research on the supply side of the market for addictive goods is limited. Becker 
et al. (1994) briefly consider the optimal pricing policy of a rational monopolistic 
producer of an addictive good. They show that the monopolist will set current 
price such that marginal revenue is less than marginal cost since future profits 
are higher when current consumption is larger (current price is smaller) because 
greater current consumption raises future consumption. They also show that 
current price and current profits can rise in the face of a drop in demand due, for 
example, to an increase in information about the harmful effects of cigarette 
smoking. Similarly, expecting a future price increase in the form of Federal 
excise tax on cigarettes7 monopolistic cigarette producer will increase the current 
price and profits. Current price rises because a decline in future demand reduces 
the gains from lowering price now. In turn, current profits rise because the 
monopolist previously was pricing below the current period profit-maximizing 
point. These trends in demand, price, and profits have characterized the 
cigarette industry since 1981.
Showalter (1991) develops a more elaborate model of the optimal pricing policy 
of a monopolistic producer of an addictive good where he also considers the 
behavior of consumers of the good. He studies four different combination:
7 A higher Federal excise tax on cigarettes was expected to go into effect at the 
beginning of 1983. Cigarette prices increased sharply not only in  1983 but 
also prior to the tax increase during 1982.
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myopic monopolist-myopic consumer, rational monopolist-myopic consumer, 
myopic monopolist-rational consumer, and rational monopolist-rational 
consumer. Using the same data set employed by Becker et al. (1994), Showalter 
finds that the rational monopolist-rational consumer model provides the best fit, 
although he treats past and future consumption as exogenous in estimating the 
demand function.
II.B.2. Empirical Applications of Rational Addiction Models: Dem and 
for Alcohol and Cocaine Consum ption
Forming a rational addiction model of demand for alcohol is more difficult when 
compared to the rational addiction models for demand of cigarettes due to some 
characteristics of alcohol consumption. One is that alcohol is not as addictive as 
cigarette because many people consume small quantities of alcohol but not 
cigarettes. In other words, alcohol consumption exhibits a more continuous 
distribution compared to cigarette consumption which has more bimodal 
distribution described by Becker and M urphy (1988).
Another distinction of alcohol consumption is that applications of rational 
addiction to alcohol consumption m ust pay attention to the heavy drinkers. 
These are people who drink heavily from time to time but are not alcoholics, 
distinguished by the fact that they consume a smaller annual am ount of alcohol 
compared to alcoholics. It is generally believed that the number of heavy
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drinking occasions and consumption by heavy drinkers and by alcoholics are not 
sensitive to price changes. If this belief were correct, the application of rational 
addiction model to alcohol consumption would not be justifiable. However, 
there are several studies that suggest otherwise.
One of the earlier pieces of the literature that oppose the conventional wisdom 
about the heavy drinking occasions of the non-alcoholics and consumption by 
heavy drinkers being not sensitive to price is by Bigelow and Liebson (1972) 
They m ade a clinical experiment using two male, skid row, chronic alcoholic 
volunteers residing in Baltimore to show that alcohol-dependent people reduce 
their alcohol consumption as a function of beverage costs. In another 
experimental study of price reductions, Babor et al. (1978), used twenty adult 
male volunteers w ith prior history of casual drinking and fourteen adult male 
volunteers with prior history of heavy drinking. They studied the effects of price 
reductions during afternoon happy hours in Boston on alcohol consumption. 
Half of the subjects w ere given price reductions for three hours in the afternoons 
and the other half purchased alcohol under a single price. Their results showed 
that the afternoon price reductions significantly increased alcohol consumption 
by both casual and heavy drinkers. When the standard purchase price was 
reinstated consumption by both groups decreased.
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Another study in this area is by Kendell et al. (1983) which examines the alcohol 
consumption by heavy and moderate drinkers before and after Scotland 
increased the excise tax for alcoholic beverages. They used a sample of 463 
residents of the Lothian region. Their results showed that alcohol consumption 
fell proportionately more among heavy drinkers than among other drinkers.
All of these studies point to the same direction. However, generalizing the 
results of these studies would be misleading due to the limited and non­
representative nature of the samples. Nevertheless they indicate that this topic is 
a good candidate for further research and refined estimates of demand functions 
for alcohol consumption are needed.
In their well known study, Cook and Tauchen (1982) examine the variations in 
death rates from cirrhosis of the liver and the variations in per capita 
consumption of distilled spirits in a time series of license State cross sections for 
1962-1977. They find that the State excise tax rate on distilled spirits has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the death rate from cirrhosis. Their 
results show that a $1 increase in the State excise tax rate lowers the death by 
between 5.4 and 10.8 percent and lowers the per capita consumption by 7.2 
percent. Clearly, their results show that consumption of distilled spirits is 
intensely sensitive to price.
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Grossman et al. (1987) use the first National Health and Nutrition Survey, which 
is conducted between 1971 and 1975 and Coate and Grossman (1988) use the 
second National Health and Nutrition Survey (1976-1980). These studies derive 
the alcohol demand functions for youths of ages sixteen through twenty-one. 
They find that the use of alcohol by youths is inversely related to the prices of 
alcoholic beverages in both data sets. The results indicate that when the price 
rises, not only the fraction of infrequent drinkers decline but the fraction of 
frequent drinkers decline even more in absolute or percentage terms. Similarly 
the fraction of heavy drinkers decline more than the fraction of light drinkers as a 
result of a price increase.8 Kenkel (1993), using 1985 National Health Interview 
Survey data, reports that among youths and adults, the number of days on which 
a person consumed five or more drinks during the past year is inversely related 
to price. Manning et al. (1995) report similar results using 1983 National Health 
Interview Survey.
The above studies are conducted in the context of a standard consumer behavior 
model. Unlike the rational addiction models, they do not try to estimate 
structural demand functions where the current consumption depends on past
8 According to their definitions, frequent drinkers drink four to seven times a 
week, fairly frequent drinkers have one to three drinks per week. Heavy 
drinkers have six or more cans of beer on a typical drinking day, fairly heavy 
drinkers drink three to five cans.
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and future consumption. Grossman et al. (1995) provide strong evidence of 
rational addictive behavior for alcohol consumption in the context of Becker- 
M urphy model, which will be presented in later parts of this study. Waters and 
Sloan (1995) use the Alcohol Supplement of the 1983 Health Interview Survey to 
estimate alcohol demand functions assuming rationally addictive consumers. 
Their findings support the rational addiction models. However, their result m ust 
be used carefully: The time lag used in the study is four years9 and only the 
current consumption value is actually known. The past consumption is 
constructed from the respondent's past drinking history. The future 
consumption is estimated based on coefficients obtained from the regression of 
the ratio of 1983 (actual) to 1979 (constructed) consumption on age, drinking 
history, race, gender, marital status, smoking variables and liquor price 
differences during the period 1979-1983. They also assumed that the 
respondents lived in the same standard metropolitan statistical area which is not 
very realistic.
Finally, Grossman et al. (1995) test the rational addiction model using micro data 
from the Monitoring the Future Survey and price information from the System to
9 Current values are from 1983, past values from 1979 and future values are 
from 1987.
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Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE).10 They apply the Becker- 
M urphy model described in the next section and find evidence in support of 
rational addictive behavior in cocaine consumption: The coefficients on past and 
future frequency of cocaine consumption as well as coefficients on past and 
future cocaine participation variables are positive and significant, and the price 
effect is significantly negative.11 They also report a larger long-run price 
elasticity compared to the short-run elasticity, which is predicted by Becker et al. 
(1991 b).
10 For prior studies on demand functions of illicit drugs that do not apply 
rational addiction model see their paper.
11 They estimate two functions. One uses cocaine participation as the 




Following Becker, Grossman, and M urphy (1994), I assume that consumers have 
a dynamic utility function in the sense that the current utility depends not only 
on the current consumption level but also past and future consumption. The 
utility function is then
U(Y„C„C,_1,el) (1)
which is assumed to be concave to satisfy the requirements of a standard utility 
function.12 Here, C is alcohol consumption, Y  is the consumption of a composite 
good and e is the effect of unmeasured variables on the utility (assumed to be 
independent from Q . The subscripts indicate the period of observation. The 
individuals are assumed to live forever and maximize the sum  of their lifetime 
utility discounted at the rate of r. If we further assume that the individual's rate
12 This utility function is actually a special case of the more general form, 
U(Yt ,C, ,S, ,et) , where S, is the stock of the addictive good. A simple process 
that determines the stock at time t is St = (1 -  £)S,_, + C,_,, where S is  the rate 
of depreciation on the stock. The utility function given in the text assumes 
that 6  = 1, i.e. the stock completely depreciates, and the term S, is replaced by
Q-r
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of time preference is equal to the interest rate and treat Y  as numeraire, the 
consumer's problem becomes13
m a x f > '- 1t/(C,,C,_1,Y(,e() (2)
1=1
subject to
t f i " \ X + P , C , )  = A  
1 - 1
where /?= l/(l+ r). A is the present value of lifetime wealth and the effect of 
consumption of the addictive good is ignored on the earnings (hence 
dAjdCf = 0, V i) and on the length of consumer's life. The level of consumption 
in the period prior to that under consideration C0 is known. Setting up  the 
lagrangean and solving for the first order conditions gives us
g y  — Uy(Q /C ,^,Y (/e,) A. — 0 (3a)
13 This equation assumes that the addictive stock depreciates fully from one 
period to the next so that the stock is totally replaced by the past value of the 
consumption. In other words the depreciation rate of the addictive stock is 
equal to one.
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— L/ic, (Q ' Q-i / ) **■ P^tc, (Q+i 'Q '^ /+ i'e/+i) — ̂  = 0 (3b)
Equation (3a) indicates that the marginal utility of the non-addictive composite 
good is equal to the marginal utility of wealth (liy = A). Equation (3b), 
U1C( + PU2C) = AP, implies that this period's marginal utility derived from the
current consumption plus the next period's utility resulting from the current 
consumption, discounted at the rate of p  equals the current price times the 
marginal utility of wealth. The nature of the addictive good will determine the 
sign of the partial derivatives of the utility function: If it is a harmful one, U2 is 
negative and if beneficial U2 is positive. On the other hand, an increase in the 
past consumption m ust have a positive effect on the marginal utility of C, for the 
current consumption to increase, regardless of the nature of the addictive good.
Considering a quadratic utility function, the solution to the equation system 
given in (3) will give us the following structural demand function:14'15
14 Intercept not shown.
15 Becker et al. (1991 a) show that, using the more general version of the model 
(see footnote 12), the demand for the addictive good, omitting the intercept 
term, becomes
c, = 0CM + pecM + e \ i+ ( \ - s fp }p , -e i( \ - <s)pw (i -  s)PM + e,e, + $ e ,. , .
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C, — 0Ct_x + P6CUX + 0XPX + 02e, + 03et+x (4)
where
^  ( « u « w W
- f i ( y 2e- u 2yu2e)
(« 1 1  " y y - O  +  A ^ W y y - ^ y )
where the lowercase letters are the coefficients of the quadratic utility function. 
Since U is concave, 6X is negative which implies that current price and current 
consumption of the addictive good are inversely related, all other variables being 
held constant. 0 in equation (4) determines the effect of past and future 
consumption of the addictive good on current consumption: When it is positive, 
greater past and future consumption will result in greater current consumption; 
when it is negative, increases in past and future consumption will decrease the 
level of current consumption.
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g _
" M?y )+ P (Uv “ yy ~ 4,)
When the consumption of a good is addictive, it is expected that the past 
consumption to reinforce the current consumption. In our context, the good will 
be considered addictive if and only if an increase in past consumption leads to an 
increase in current consumption, holding P, , X, e, and e(+1 constant. In other 
words, if 0is positive then the good is addictive. In addition, the m agnitude of 0 
will measure the degree of addiction: the more addictive a good, the greater is 
the reinforcement from the past consumption, hence larger 0.
Equation (4) provides us with a basis of empirical analysis: The consumption in 
current period is expressed in terms of past and future consumption, current 
price and the unobservables. Applying ordinary least squares estimation to this 
equation though will result in biased parameter estimates. The unobserved 
errors, e ,, that effect the utility are likely to be serially correlated. Even if these 
variables are not correlated, CM depends on e, and Ct+1 depends on e(+1 through 
the optimizing behavior implied by equation (4). Thus, even if the true value of 
0 is zero, ordinary lest squares estimation might incorrectly indicate that past 
and future consumption affect current consumption.
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Note that in equation (4), the right hand side variables does not include only the 
past and future prices of the addictive good, i.e. PM and P,+1 affect the current 
consumption through their effects on C,.t and Cm. This provides us w ith a 
mechanism to solve the endogeneity problem of past and future consumption. 
Provided that the unobservables are uncorrelated w ith prices in these periods, 
past and future prices are logical instruments for CM and C,+1, since past prices 
directly affect past consumption, and future prices directly affect future 
consumption.
The empirical analysis described above can be refined further by including 
certain life cycle variables such as the marital status, employment, religious 
participation, education etc., that affect the utility and therefore determine e ,. If
———  = 0 and -  *  0 then C, depends on e, but not on e(+1 in equation (4).
Then a current demographic or socioeconomic variable can be used as regressor 
in the structural demand function given by equation (4), and past and future 
values of the same variable will be instruments for past and future consumption.
In the empirical analysis presented here, the coefficient of the future 
consumption will provide a direct test of a rational model of addiction as 
opposed to the alternative of myopic addiction. In the latter case, the consumer 
does not consider the effect of the current consumption on future utility and
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future consumption. Specifically, a myopic individual has a first-order condition 
for the utility maximization problem that does not contain the term (3U2 as in the 
equation (3b). Therefore, the solution to the myopic first-order condition for C, 
— the myopic equivalent of equation (4) — does not contain the terms C(+1 and 
e(+1 on the right hand side. The consumer is completely backward-looking: 
Current consumption depends only on current price, past consumption, the 
marginal utility of wealth — through Bx in equation (5) — and current events. 
Hence, the myopic behavior implies that the coefficient on the future 
consumption should be zero, while the rational model implies that it should have 
the same sign as the coefficient on past consumption. Note also that the 
m agnitude of the coefficient on the future consumption is determined by the 
coefficient on the past consumption and the discount factor.
Equation (4) implies that there is intertemporal complementarity or negative 
cross price elasticities between alcohol consumption at various points in time. 
Holding the prices in all other periods constant, a price increase in period f-1 will 
decrease the consumption in that period. The negative effect of this price change 
will be then seen on the current consumption through the term 0CtA , since 0 is 
positive even though the price in current period is kept constant. Similarly, if Pw 
increases w ith prices in all other periods held constant, Cm will decrease and 
through the term (30, C, will decrease.
32
This analysis can be easily extended to a permanent increase in price. Since the 
price will be higher in all future periods, consumption will be lower in all future 
periods. In addition, the individual will consume even less because at any 
period she or he faces a lower consumption for the next period. This suggests 
that under rational addiction assumption, the short-run demand elasticity for the 
addictive good will be substantially different than the long-run elasticity. The 
short-run effect is the response to a price change in period t and all future 
periods that is not anticipated until period t. The long-run price effect pertains to 
price change in all periods. Since CM remains the same if the price change is 
unanticipated until period t, the short-run effect m ust be smaller than the long- 
run  effect.
In order to see these results in mathematical terms, one can solve the second- 
order difference equation in (4), which will give the current consumption in 
terms of prices and life-cycle variables in all periods.16 Given the following roots 
of the different equation, and w ith 402/? < 1, $  < 1 , and >1 for a stable 
system,
16 For the derivation of the solutions see Becker et al (1994).
33
i - V i - 4  e1p  
20
l  + y]l-4:02J3 
29
(9)
the following current, past and future temporary effects are obtained:
cC, 6> 




Since ^  < 0, all these temporary effects are negative. The short-run effect is
dC, ___ 3
dP 0 ( l - k ) k (13)
and the long-run effect is
dC
dP 0 { l - k M -1 )  (1 -0 - /7 0 )
(14)
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As mentioned in the previous paragraph, this long-run effect m ust be greater 
than the short-run effect, because the ratio of equation (14) to equation (13) is 
$>/(& ~ 1)/ an<3 >1 as stated above.
35
IV. Data
IV.A. Monitoring the Future Survey
Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan started surveying high 
school seniors in 1975 as part of the Monitoring the Future research program 17. 
Each year, a nationally representative sample of 15,000 to 19,000 students are 
surveyed between March 15 and April 30 and they are asked several questions 
on consumption of cigarettes, alcohol and illegal drugs among others. Starting 
w ith the class of 1976, approximately 2,400 of these seniors are chosen to be 
followed up. In this sample, respondents reporting daily marijuana use or use of 
any other illegal drug are over-represented by a factor of three18. This selected 
sample of 1976 seniors are followed up every two years. Starting w ith 1977, the 
seniors selected to be followed-up are divided into two groups of 1,200 each; one 
group is surveyed on even-numbered years, and the other on odd-numbered 
years after the baseline year. This means that for any baseline sample (except the 
1976 baseline) half of the respondents are followed up the first time only one 
year after they graduate, and the other half are followed up two years from their
17 These surveys are described in detail by Johnston et a l (1993).
18 In this sample, approximately 15% accounts for these observations, meaning 
that in the nationally representative sample around 5% met this criterion.
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graduation. Thereafter, all respondents were sent survey questionnaires at two 
year intervals.
The data used for this study consist of the panels created using the samples 
chosen to be followed up. There are thirteen baseline samples that gives us 
twenty-four panels: First panel is formed of the 1976 class and has seven waves 
of data (one for the baseline and six for the follow-ups). The baseline for second 
and third panels is 1977 and each has six follow-up waves. Fourth panel starts 
w ith 1978 baseline and has again a total of seven waves. Since the last data is 
only available until 1989, the next four panels have a total of six waves of data. 
The panels nine through twelve has five waves, thirteen through sixteen four 
waves and panels seventeen through twenty has three waves. The baseline for 
panel twenty is 1986. The Michigan data set contains four more panels but they 
have only two waves. Since the empirical analysis for the rational addiction 
model requires the past, current and future values of consumption and price, as 
well as socioeconomic and demographic variables, only the first twenty panels 
can be used in this study. In order to have more consistent interval only the odd 
num bered panels where all the observations are two years apart will be used in 
this analysis.
Each person in this data set will have between one and five records. The baseline 
observation will be used for the past values of the variables from the first follow-
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up, which will be the first record of each person. The future values of the 
variables in the first record will be taken from the second follow-up. This first 
record exists for all the respondents, because we have a t least three waves of data 
for the first twenty panels. The current values for the second record comes from 
the second follow-up, the past values from the first follow-up and the future 
values from the third follow-up. The second record exists only for those in 
panels one through sixteen. The other records for each respondent are created 
using the same procedure where only respondents in the first four panels have 
five records19. Note that since only the odd numbered panels are considered for 
the regression analysis, the past value of the variables refer to second annual lag 
and the future values to the second annual lead.
As the description of the sample suggests I am applying the rational addiction 
model to the demand for alcohol by teenagers and young adults. The majority of 
the respondents are seventeen years old at the baseline, nineteen at the first 
follow-up, twenty-one at the second, twenty-three at the third, twenty-five at the 
fourth and twenty-seven at the fifth follow-up. Note that practically all of the 
sample were illegal drinkers at the baseline because every state has had a
19 See Table 1 for the panel structure.
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m inimum legal age for purchasing and drinking alcoholic beverages of at least 
eighteen since 1930s.20
Becker an M urphy (1988) indicate that the consumption of addictive goods are 
more likely to be characterized by a bimodal distribution. As opposed to the 
cigarette consumption, alcohol consumption is more continuous in the general 
consumption. It is more likely for a person to have a few occasional drinks than 
to smoke a few cigarette now and then. It is therefore more difficult to apply the 
rational addiction model to alcohol consumption. However, the sample to be 
analyzed in this paper does not represent the general population. The particular 
age group in question is more sensitive to price. Rachal et al. (1980) indicate that 
m any youths begin to drink alcohol well before the age of eighteen. Since this 
group usually do not have regular income, they will be very sensitive to price 
changes. As indicated before, the follow-up samples include three times the 
actual proportion of illegal drug users, and these individuals consume more 
alcohol than who do not use illegal drugs (Yamaguchi and Kandel 1984).
Another reason why the Michigan panel data is suitable for rational addiction 
analysis is that the alcohol dependence and abuse is most prevalent among
20 Since the legal minimum drinking age was raised to twenty-one in several 
states between 1976 and 1987, in later panels, even some of the respondents 
in the first follow-up and second follow-up were illegal drinkers.
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persons aged eighteen through twenty-nine (Grant et al. 1991). This range is very 
close to the range of our sample. Based on data from 1988 National Health 
Interview Survey, Grant et al. (1991) report that the prevalence rate of alcohol 
abuse and dependence fell from seventeen percent for persons aged eighteen 
through twenty-nine to less than two percent for persons aged sixty-five and 
over. Moreover, the prevalence rate in the youngest category was almost double 
the rate of persons aged thirty through forty-four.
The preceding arguments suggest that the coefficient of past consumption — 6 in 
equation (4) — is likely to be larger in the Monitoring the Future panel sample 
than in a representative panel of persons of all ages. From equation (14), we 
know that larger values of 0 lead to larger long-run price effect, which will 
provide the basis for predicting the sensitivity of the panel to the price changes. 
Another variable that indicates the same prediction is the discount factor of 
youths and the young adults: They are likely to have lower time discount 
factors21 (fi) than older adults. Becker et al. (1991) show that a reduction in the 
discount factor increases the long-run price effect. Another reason for greater 
price sensitivity by teenagers and young adults is the peer pressure. This group 
individuals are more likely to drink if their peers also engage in this behavior. In 
this case, a fall in price of alcohol causes each consumer to increase his or her
21 Their time preference for the present is higher.
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demand for this addictive good. Then through the peer effect this increase in 
demand is reinforced. When we combine this peer effect with the reinforcement 
effect of the addictive nature alcohol consumption, we would expect a greater 
price sensitivity in our sample.
IV.B. Prices and Cost of Living Indices
Monitoring the Future data described above include the county level FIPS codes. 
Therefore, it was possible to add alcoholic beverage prices to the each 
respondent's observation. This information is available from the Inter-City Cost 
of Living Index, published quarterly by the American Chamber of Commerce 
Researchers Association (ACCRA) at the city level for between 250 and 300 cities 
since the first quarter of 1968. The ACCRA collects data for several consumer 
goods, including beer, wine and distilled spirits. In addition to price 
information, a cost of living index for each of the cities is computed which is 
normalized to one in a given quarter.22
As previously mentioned, the baseline survey is conducted between March 15 
and April 30, when the respondent is still a senior. The follow-up surveys are 
mailed to their home addresses during the first half of April. It is therefore
22 This will give the cost of living in one city relative to the national average — 
as defined by the cities included in the sample — in a given quarter and year.
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assumed that the annual alcohol consumption measure described in the next 
section will reflect the consumption in the first two quarters of the survey year 
and the last two quarters of the previous year. Consequently, the annual alcohol 
price is calculated as a simple average of these quarters. The future price, which 
is two years after the current observation, is calculated as the simple average of 
the last two quarters one year after the survey is mailed and the first two 
quarters of the year after. In other words, the year in our sample is defined from 
July 1st of the previous year through June 30th of the current year.23
Since the alcoholic beverage prices are collected at the city level and we only 
know the county of residence of the respondents, the nearest city's price is 
assigned to the county where the respondent lived. Note that the prices are 
never matched to counties from cities in a neighboring state because m uch of the 
variation in alcoholic beverage prices is due to the differences in state excise 
taxes. Furthermore, if a respondents's county of residence is different from  one 
observation to the next, then a simple average of prices from these two counties 
are used starting the third quarter of the current year, through the fourth quarter 
of the next year. This will effect the future price calculation which is the average
23 For example, year 1980 in our sample refers to the period 07/01/79 to 
06/30/80. Then, the future value for prices for this year is the simple 
average of quarterly prices from 3rd and 4th quarters of 1981 and 1st and 2nd 
quarters of 1982.
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of the first two quarters two years after the current one and the last two quarters 
— which are now averages themselves — one year after the current year.
The Monitoring the Future survey has five questionnaires each addressing one of 
the sections in more detail. Four of these questionnaires did not ask the specific 
alcoholic beverage consumption. Since the most heavily consumed alcoholic 
beverage is beer and since it is preferred among teenagers and young adults, 
beer prices are used as the measure of alcoholic beverage in the regression 
analyses. The ACCRA started collecting the beer prices only in 1982. Since the 
past value of price in the first record of a respondent from the first panel m ust 
come from 1976, it was necessary to use regression analysis to estimate the beer 
prices as far back as that year. To complete the series, the nominal ACCRA beer 
price is regressed on the sum  of the state and federal excise tax, quarterly U.S. 
beer price index (1982-84=1),24 ACCRA city-specific cost of living index times 
quarterly CPI for the U.S. (1982-1984=1),25 and dichotomous indicator variables 
for the first three quarters of a given year. Then, using the regression 
coefficients, the beer prices for quarters prior to 1982 are estimated. This
24 Consumer Price Index, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
25 As noted in footnote 22, ACCRA gives the cost of living in a city relative to 
the average of all cities in that year. By multiplying this index by the U.S. 
Consumer Price Index, which gives the cost of living relative to the average 
of 1982-1984 for the U.S. in general, the effects of price changes in time, as 
well as price differences among cities are captured.
43
quarterly nominal beer price series is then converted to real terms by dividing 
them by the year- and city-specific cost of living index described in footnote 25. 
The annual prices are obtained by averaging this real price measure over the four 
relevant quarters described previously.
IV.C. Measurement o f Variables
The data set consists of 7,945 respondents yielding 21,420 person-years (see page 
36 for data set structure). There are no missing values for the following 
variables: the number of alcoholic drinks in the past year; past, current and 
future real beer price; current real annual earnings; age, male, black, and other 
race/ethnicity. Missing values for the other variables are replaced by panel- and 
strata-specific means.26 The means and standard deviations of these variables are 
given in Table 2. Note that these figures are weighted to correct for 
oversampling of persons in the illegal drug stratum. Thus, the means and 
standard deviations in the table are representative of those in the population.
The num ber of drinks of alcohol consumed in the past year is the dependent 
variable in all regressions in the next section. This variable is given by the
26 Note that there are two strata for each panel: Persons who used marijuana 
daily at baseline or used another illegal drug during the past m onth at 
baseline, and persons who did not exhibit these illegal drug use patterns at 
baseline.
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product of the num ber of drinking occasions during the last 12 months and the 
num ber of drinks consumed on a typical drinking occasion. Both components 
are measured w ith error. The number of drinking occasions is an ordered 
categorical variable w ith 7 outcomes: 0 occasions, 1-2 occasions, 3-5 occasions, 6-9 
occasions, 10-19 occasions, 20-39 occasions, and 40 or more occasions. It is 
converted into a continuous variable by assigning midpoints to the closed 
intervals and a value of 50 to the open-ended interval.
The num ber of drinks on a typical drinking occasion is inferred from the 
response to the question: "On the occasions that you drink alcoholic beverages, 
how often do you drink enough to feel pretty high?" The response categories are 
none of the occasions, few of the occasions, half of the occasions, most of the 
occasions, and nearly all of the occasions.27 I assume that the second response 
category corresponds to 25 percent of all occasions, that fourth corresponds to 75 
percent of all occasions, and that the fifth corresponds to 100 percent of all 
occasions. I also assume that 4 drinks m ust be consumed to feel pretty high.
27 Four-fifths of the sample are asked the above question. The other one-fifth is 
asked: "W hen you drink alcoholic beverages, how high do you usually get?" 
The responses are not at all high, a little high, moderately high, and very 
high. The responses to these two questions are m ade compatible by treating 
persons who usually get very high as persons who drink enough to feel 
pretty high on nearly all drinking occasions, persons who usually get 
moderately high as persons who get pretty high on half of all drinking 
occasions, and persons who get a little high as persons who get pretty high 
on few of all drinking occasions.
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Persons in the first response category are assumed to consume 1.5 drinks on a 
typical drinking occasion (I assume that respondents will not feel pretty high if 
they drink one or two drinks). To calculate the number of drinks per occasion 
for the categories in between, I multiply these two extremes by the percentage 
associated with each: Persons in the second category are assumed to consume 
0.25 x 4 + 0.75x1.5 = 2.125 drinks on a typical occasion. Persons in third 
category are assigned 0.50 x 4 + 0.50x1.5 = 2.75 drinks per occasion and persons 
in the fourth category are assigned a value of 0.75 x 4+0.25 x 1.5 = 3.375
Like the current annual price of beer, the legal drinking age variable is calculated 
as the annual average of the first two quarters of the survey year and last two 
quarters of the year prior to the survey. Since it determines how difficult it is to 
obtain beer, this variable is a partial determinant of the full price of alcohol, 
especially for underage youths.29 This variable is multiplied by a dichotomous 
variable that is equal to one for those respondents that are of age twenty-one or
28 In an alternative specification, the number of drinks per occasion is 
calculated differently for females, with not much effect on the results. This 
suggests that although the num ber of drinks in a typical drinking occasion is 
calculated subjectively, the results obtained are fairly accurate.
29 This variable represents the minimum legal drinking age for the purchase 
and consumption of low alcohol beer and accounts for the grandfather 
clauses many states adopted when raising their legal ages for all alcoholic 
beverages to 21 years to comply w ith the Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act 
of 1984. For more details on the construction of the legal drinking age 
measure, see Chaloupka el al. (1993).
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younger and zero otherwise. This will allow to capture the effect of variation in 
minimum drinking age laws on the relevant portion of the sample,. In other 
words, since no state has ever had a legal drinking age greater than twenty-one, 
the value of the variable used in regressions will be equal to zero for respondents 
older than twenty-one years old, restricting the effect of such laws. Note that 
since the birth date of the respondent is not known, it is not known when she or 
he become a legal drinker. Therefore, the dichotomous variable indicating that 
the age is less than or equal to twenty-one is actually based on the follow-up 
number: As explained in section IV.A the majority of the sample were nineteen 
years old in the first follow-up and twenty-one in the second follow-up. Along 
the same lines, the four age variables in Table 2 are actually dichotomous 
indicators for the first, second, third, and fourth follow-ups, respectively.
It will be easier — hence less costly — to obtain alcoholic beverage for those 
underage youth who reside close to a state w ith a lower legal drinking age. In 
order to capture this potential of border crossing, in addition to the own-state 
minimum legal drinking age described above, a dichotomous indicator for lower 
border drinking age is created. This variable will be equal to one if a respondent 
lives in a county within 25 miles of a state with a lower legal drinking age and 
zero otherwise. For the same reasons as w ith the legal drinking age variable, it is 
interacted w ith the dichotomous indicator for persons whose age is less than or
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equal to twenty-one. Holding the own-state legal drinking age constant, the 
coefficient of the border age variable in the demand function should be 
positive.30
A variety of independent variables were constructed from the demographic and 
socioeconomic information collected in the surveys. These include sex, race 
(black or other, omitted category is whites), age (see above), real annual earnings, 
years of formal schooling completed, college student status (full-time, half-time, 
or less than half-time, omitted category is not-in-college), work status (full-time, 
part-time, or unemployed, omitted category is not-in-labor force)31, religious 
participation (infrequent or frequent, omitted category is no participation), 
marital status (married, engaged, or separated or divorced, omitted category is 
singles), and the respondent's num ber of children. Finally, all models include 
dichotomous variables for nine of the ten cohorts (the high school senior classes 
of 1976 through 1984). The time-varying variables serve as proxies for life-cycle 
variables that affect the marginal utility of current consumption.
30 For a detailed discussion of legal drinking age effects, see Grossman et al. 
(1987), Coate and Grossman (1988), Laixuthai and Chaloupka (1993).
31 Full-time work status and full-time college student status are not m utually 
exclusive categories in theory or in the follow-up questionnaires.
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At the first follow-up, past values of socioeconomic variables pertain to baseline 
data. Since they were seniors at the baseline, the past value of years of formal 
schooling completed at the first follow-up equals eleven for all respondents, and 
the past values of college student status indicators (see above) are all equal to 
zero. The past work status is taken from a baseline question on average hours of 
work per week during the school year.32 High school seniors who do not work 
at all during the school year are assumed to be not in the labor force rather than 
unemployed. The lag of earnings as of the first follow-up equals the sum  of 
income from work during the school year and other sources such as allowances 
and sum m er jobs.33
32 Full-time workers at baseline are students who work more than 20 hours per 
week during the school year.
33 For the follow-up surveys, respondents are only asked about own earnings.
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V. Empirical Estimation
As mentioned in section IV. A, only the odd numbered panels are used in  the 
regression analysis. This means that the all the observations are two years apart. 
Therefore all the references to past values are for two years earlier and all 
references to future values are two years later than the current year. In section 
III, it is explained that the past and future consumption are endogenous to the 
model. Therefore, the equation (4) is fitted by two-stage least squares (TSLS). 
The instruments consist of the exogenous variables in the model, the past annual 
real beer price, the future annual real beer price, the past values of the two 
measures pertaining to the legal drinking age (legal drinking age*age<21 and 
lower border drinking age in d ica to ^ ag e^ l)34, and the past and future values of 
all time-varying socioeconomic variables. These socioeconomic variables include 
real annual earnings, years of formal schooling completed, college student status, 
work status, religious participation, marital status, and num ber of children.
The past and future values of all time-varying socioeconomic variables are valid 
instruments for reasons given in Section III. Moreover, the second lead and lag 
of the real beer price and the second lag of the drinking age do not provide 
enough explanatory power to obtain reliable parameter estimates. Probably this
34 The future values of variables pertaining to the legal drinking age are not 
used as instruments because they are equal to zero except at the first follow- 
up.
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is because in a given year, the real beer price and the drinking age measures vary 
only among counties, while past and future consumption vary among persons.
A problem with the use of leads and lags of the socioeconomic variables as 
instruments is that these variables may not be exogenous. While plausible 
arguments can be made for the endogeneity of all of them, the real issue is which 
ones are most likely to be caused by alcohol consumption or correlated w ith the 
disturbance term in the structural alcohol demand function given by equation 
(4). I assume that, religious participation, marital status, and num ber of children 
are more likely to be correlated w ith alcohol consumption.35 Therefore, demand 
functions are obtained with and without these variables.
Note that because of the way the alcohol consumption variable is constructed 
(see page 43), it is subject to measurement error and the results in Section VI. A 
m ust be interpreted accordingly: Almost 38 percent of — unweighted — cases 
fall into the open-ended frequency category of 40 or more drinking occasions in 
the past 12 months. Clearly, the magnitudes of price elasticities will be affected 
by the num ber of drinking occasions assigned — 50 in this study — to this 
category. Thus, it is more important to focus on the relative magnitudes of the
35 For evidence that marriage causes reductions in alcohol consumption, see 
Miller-Tutzauer et al. (1991). For evidence that heavy drinking lowers the 
probability of marriage, see Kenkel and Ribar (1994).
51
elasticities (the long-run elasticity relative to the short-run elasticity or relative to 
the elasticity that ignores addiction) than on the absolute magnitudes of the 
elasticities. O n the other hand, the drinking frequency measure is a more 
objective measure compared to the measure of the number of drinks on a typical 
drinking day. Therefore, the probability of frequent drinking is treated as a 
separate outcome in Section VI.B.
Note also that the real price of beer, as described in Section IV.B, contains 
measurement error for several reasons: First, the price prior to the first quarter 
of 1982 was obtained by regression analysis. Second, the price that the 
respondent faces may be different than the one used in estimating the demand 
functions because there is no guarantee that nearest ACCRA survey city to the 
respondent's county of residence is actually the city or* town in which the 
respondent actually resides. Finally, the cost of living index reflects expenditure 
patterns of middle-income households which may well be different from those of 
teenagers and young adults. Since random  measurement error in an 
independent variable will bias its coefficient and t-ratio toward zero, the price 
coefficients and associated t-ratios in Section VI are conservative lower-bound 
estimates.36
36 There is an additional source of error in the calculation of future price: It is 
assumed that respondents fully anticipate that they will move and that they
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The regressions in the next section are obtained using the whole sample w ithout 
weighting for the illegal drug use stratum. Maddala (1983 pp. 170-171) shows 
that this is the appropriate procedure in the case of exogenous stratification 
(oversampling on the basis of an exogenous variable in a regression model). The 
reason is that in regression analysis weighting is employed to produce efficient 
estimates rather than to produce consistent estimates. There is no reason why 
the drawing of non-equiproportionate samples from different strata should 
introduce heteroscedasticity such that the variance of residual is dependent on 
the sampling fraction.
M addala also shows that in the case of endogenous stratification it is appropriate 
to weight by the square root of the inverse of the sampling fraction.37 However 
in the regression specifications used in this study, the drug strata is not used as 
either dependent nor independent variable. Furthermore, M addala's model 
assumes that the slope coefficients are the same in the two strata. The 
coefficients resulting from the regressions are then essentially averages for the
are aware of the future prices in their new neighborhood. A detailed 
discussion of the effects of measurement error in future price on rational 
addiction estimates of cigarette demand functions can be found in Becker et 
al. (1994). Moulton (1990) argues that t-ratios of coefficients of aggregate 
variables in micro regressions are biased downward if the disturbances in 
the regression are correlated among persons who live in the same area. This 
assumes, however, that the aggregate variable is measured w ithout error.
37 See Maddala (1983), pp. 171-173.
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two strata, w ith more weight given to the illegal drug stratum  than would be the 
case in a random  sample. In fact, experimentation with weighted regressions did 
not result in coefficients that are much different from the ones presented in 
Section VI. Another argum ent about this analysis is the question of participation 
in alcohol consumption vs. consumption given participation. This distinction is 
not made in the empirical analysis because of the very low percentage of 
respondents who did not have any drink during the past year — only eight 
percent reported that they did not drink during the previous 12 months.
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VI. Results
VI.A. Alcohol Demand functions
Table 3 contains standard alcohol demand functions that ignore addictive 
behavior, i.e. past and future consumption are excluded from these estimates. 
The regression in column 1 omits religious participation, marital status, and 
num ber of children, while the regression in column 2 includes these variables.
The m ost important findings in these regressions are the negative and significant 
price and legal drinking age effects and the positive and significant border age 
effect. The magnitude, but not the significance, of the price coefficient is 
sensitive to the inclusion of religious participation, marital status, and num ber of 
children. In particular, the price coefficient is cut in half when these variables are 
added to the set of regressors. At the weighted sample means of price and 
consumption, the price elasticity of demand equals -0.38 in the first regression 
and -0.20 in the second regression.38 The first estimate may be influenced by 
omitted variables bias, while the second may be influenced by simultaneous 
equations bias. Therefore, we regard the average of these two figures of -0.29 as
38 All elasticities in this section and the next one are computed at the weighted 
sample means of price and consumption. Elasticities computed at the 
unweighted sample means are similar.
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the benchmark price elasticity that emerges from a demand function for the 
num ber of drinks of alcohol in the past year that ignores addictive behavior.
Table 4 tests the rational addiction model directly by estimating the structural 
dem and function given by equation (4). The first two columns contain two-stage 
least squares (TSLS) regressions in which past consumption and future 
consumption (as they are defined in previous sections) are endogenous. 
Religious participation, marital status, and number of children are excluded from 
the first regression and included in the second. The instruments for past and 
future consumption are all the exogenous variables in the model, the past and 
the future beer price, the past values of the legal drinking age and lower border 
age dummy, interacted with the dichotomous variable for those respondents 
who are 21 years old or younger, and the past and future time-varying 
socioeconomic variables. The last two columns contain the corresponding 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The table also contains F-ratios 
resulting from W u's (1973) test of the hypothesis that OLS estimates are 
consistent.
In the model w ith religious participation, marital status, and num ber of children, 
the consistency of OLS is rejected. In the model without these variables, the Wu 
test is inconclusive. The F-ratio of 3.18 is significant at the 5 percent level bu t not 
at the 1 percent level. Given these results and the potential endogeneity of
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religious participation, marital status, and number of children, it is useful to 
consider the OLS regressions as well as the TSLS regressions in evaluating the 
findings.
The estimated effects of past and future consumption on current consumption 
are significantly positive in the four regressions in Table 4, and the estimated 
price and legal drinking age effects are significantly negative in all cases. The 
positive and significant past consumption coefficient is consistent w ith the 
hypothesis that alcohol consumption is an addictive behavior. The positive and 
significant future consumption coefficient is consistent w ith the hypothesis of 
rational addiction and inconsistent with the hypothesis of myopic addiction. The 
sum  of the past and future consumption coefficients is always smaller than one 
which means that the long-run, short-run, and temporary price effects are all 
negative.
Clearly, the estimates indicate that alcohol consumption is addictive in the sense 
that past and future changes significantly impact current consumption. This 
evidence is inconsistent w ith the hypothesis that alcohol consumers are myopic. 
Still, the estimates are not fully consistent w ith rational addiction because the 
estimates of the discount factor (J3) — given by the ratio of the coefficient of 
future consumption to the coefficient of past consumption — are implausibly 
high. The implied discount factor is 2.58 in the first regression, 1.26 in the second
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regression, 1.37 in the third regression, and 1.34 in the fourth regression. These 
discount factors correspond to negative interest rates of -61 percent, -20 percent, 
-27 percent, and -26 percent, respectively.
The standard errors of the four estimates of the discount factor are 0.76, 0.23, 
0.04, and 0.04, respectively.39 The estimates of 2.58, 1.37, and 1.34 are 
significantly greater than one (f-ratios equal 2.08, 9.25, and 8.50, respectively). 
Not only the estimate of 1.26 is not significantly greater than one (t-ratio equals 
1.13), but, it is also not significantly greater than 0.95 (t-ratio equals 1.35). A 
discount factor of 0.95 corresponds to a quite reasonable interest rate of 5 
percent. When this discount factor is imposed a priori, the price and legal 
drinking age coefficients — presented in Table 5 — are very close to the 
corresponding coefficients in Table 4. These results, combined w ith the detailed 
analysis in Becker et al. (1994), suggest that data on alcohol consumption or 
cigarette smoking are not rich enough to pin down the discount factor with 
precision even if the rational addiction model is accepted.
39 If a is the coefficient of past consumption, b is the coefficient of future 
consumption, va is the variance of a, vb is the variance of b, and cab be the 
covariance between a and b. Then the variance of ratio b /  a is given by
a 2v+ b2a Ava- 7 b - \ h.
39 For a derivation, see Kmenta (1986, p. 486).
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Table 6 explores the effects of more leads and lags of the beer price as an 
instrument. In these regressions first and third annual lag and lead of beer price 
are added to the list of instruments. The results are very similar to the ones in 
Table 4 and reinforces the validity of rational addictive behavior in this sample.
Table 7 is an attem pt to estimate the equation explained in footnote 15, the more 
general model where the stock variable does not depreciate fully. The 
depreciation rate is assumed to be 80 percent. The regression specification is 
similar to the one in Table 4, but the stock variable replaces the past consumption 
variable. The future consumption and the stock variable are endogenous, and 
the instruments are the same as in Table 4. Results from regression analysis of 
other depreciation rates (0.4 through 0.9 in increments of 0.1) were similar to 
those in Table 4, but 8=0.8 had the highest determination coefficient. As in Table 
4, Wu test rejects the hypothesis that OLS is consistent when religious 
participation, marital status, and number of children are included in the model. 
But the test fails to reject this hypothesis when the restricted set of variables is 
used (column 1). The coefficient estimates obtained from this model is consistent 
w ith rational addiction assumptions, but the future price coefficients are never 
significant. This can be attributed to the high degree of correlation (0.75) 
between current and future price.
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Table 8 uses the estimates from Table 4 to compute the elasticity of the annual 
num ber of drinks of alcohol w ith respect to the various price changes defined by 
equations starting on page 33 at the weighted sample means of price and 
consumption. The long-run elasticity ranges from -0.26 to -1.26 (average equals 
-0.65). The short-run elasticity ranges from -0.18 to -0.86 (average equals -0.41). 
The ratio of the long-run elasticity to the corresponding short-run elasticity is 
more stable. It varies from 1.44 to 1.77 (average equals 1.60). This ratio should 
be compared to a ratio of approximately 2.00 in the case of rational addiction 
demand functions for cigarettes (Chaloupka 1991; Becker et al. 1994). Becker et al. 
(1991 b) show that the ratio of the long-run price elasticity to the short-run price 
elasticity rises as the degree of addiction, measured by the coefficient of past 
consumption, rises. Thus, the results presented here suggest that alcohol 
consumption is somewhat less addictive than cigarette smoking. Nevertheless, 
the long-run elasticity of demand for the number of drinks of alcohol in the past 
year is substantially larger than the short-run elasticity. Hence, the long-run 
reduction in consumption caused by a permanent price increase due, for example 
to an increase in the federal excise tax rate on beer, would be considerably larger 
than the reduction in consumption after one year.
The average long-run price elasticity of -0.65 also is more than twice as large as 
the benchmark price elasticity of -0.29 that emerge from the demand functions in
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Table 3 that ignore addiction. Indeed, the average short-run elasticity is almost 
40 percent larger than the benchmark elasticity. Consequently, forecasts of 
increases in tax revenue due to excise tax hikes would be considerably overstated 
and forecasts of reductions in consumption would be considerably understated if 
they were based on the benchmark elasticity.
With regard to the temporary price elasticities, a 10 percent reduction in the 
current price causes consumption to rise by between 1 and 1.5 percent. A 10 
percent reduction in current price also leads to an increase of between 0.3 percent 
and 0.7 percent in next period's consumption and to a 0.4 to 1.2 percent increase 
in the previous period's consumption. These negative cross price effects are 
inconsistent w ith non-addictive behavior, and the negative future price effect is 
inconsistent w ith myopic behavior. The future price elasticity exceeds the past 
price elasticity because the estimate of the discount factor always is larger than 
one.
In Table 9, I examine the robustness of the price and consumption effects by 
estimating a two-stage least squares fixed-effects model. Using this technique, all 
time-varying variables are transformed into deviations from person-specific 
means and delete time-invariant variables from the regressions. This approach is 
equivalent to including a dummy variable for each person in an untransformed 
specification. It controls for unobserved heterogeneity, which may be correlated
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with religious participation, marital status, and the number of children. Thus the 
fixed-effects specification is an alternative way to control for the forces captured 
by these variables and they are omitted. Since the Wu test strongly rejects the 
consistency of OLS (F-ratio equals 9.22), only the TSLS coefficients are presented 
in the table.40
The results in Table 9 strongly confirm those in Table 4. The past and future 
consumption coefficients are positive and significant, while the current price 
coefficient is negative and significant. The long-run price elasticity of -0.54 is 
substantial. As previously mentioned (section V, page 51), the real price of beer 
contains random  measurement error for a variety of reasons. The downw ard 
bias in the price coefficient and its f-ratio due to this factor are exacerbated in the 
fixed-effects model (Griliches 1979; Griliches and Hausman 1986). Thus, the 
estimates in Table 9 are not necessarily superior to those in Table 4. Taken 
together, however, the two tables underscore the stability and validity of the 
findings in this study.
40 Although the model in Table 9 contains the same time-varying regressors as 
the first model in Table 4, it is not surprising that the Wu test decisively 
rejects OLS in the former table but not the latter. Nickell (1981) shows that 
fixed-effects OLS estimation produces a negative bias and inconsistency in 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the absence of serial 
correlation. Using his techniques, one can demonstrate that the coefficients 
of past and future consumption are understated in the OLS fixed-effects
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Moore and Cook (1995) provide further evidence in support of a rational model 
of alcohol addiction in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The members 
of that survey are approximately the same age as the members of Monitoring the 
Future. Moore and Cook report positive effects of past and future consumption 
on current consumption and a  negative effect of the state beer tax on 
consumption. Their study differs from this one for a number of reasons. First, 
they have only two observations on current consumption. Second, they do not 
measure the cost of alcohol by the city-specific beer price. Third, because the 
beer tax coefficient is estimated somewhat imprecisely. Finally, the long-run 
beer tax effect is not always negative. Moreover, their main focus is on habit 
formation via the effects of past variables rather than on rational addiction.
VLB. Participation in Frequent Drinking
In this section, I examine the determinants of participation in frequent drinking. 
Frequent drinkers are those who report forty or more drinking occasions in the 
past year. Recall that this is the upper open-ended interval in the drinking 
frequency item on the questionnaire. Thirty-three percent of all cases (weighted) 
fall into this category, It is particularly important to focus on the frequent 
drinking outcome because it was assigned a value of 50 occasions in the past year
model. Indeed, when this procedure is used, past and future consumption
coefficients become negative.
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in com puting the annual num ber of drinks. Clearly, the elasticities reported in 
the last section would be affected if a different value had been used.
Linear probability models are obtained. In principle, standard errors of 
regression coefficients should be corrected based on White's (1980) algorithm. In 
fact, the correction had almost no impact on the standard errors in preliminary 
calculations, which is not surprising given the large sample size. Thus, f-ratios 
are based on uncorrected standard errors. The two-stage least squares estimates 
correspond to Heckman and MaCurdy's (1985) simultaneous equations linear 
probability model.
I begin w ith regressions of the probability of forty or more annual drinking 
occasions that ignore addictive behavior by excluding past and future 
consumption. The results (shown in Table 10) mirror those in Table 3. In 
particular, the price and legal drinking age effects are negative and significant, 
while the border age effect is positive and significant. The magnitude, but not 
the significance, of the price coefficient is sensitive to the inclusion of religious 
participation, marital status, and number of children. At the weighted sample 
means of price and participation in frequent drinking, the price elasticity of 
dem and equals -0.44 in the regression without these variables and -0.22 in the 
regression w ith them. The average of these two figures of -0.33 may be regarded
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as the benchmark elasticity for participation in frequent drinking that emerges 
from a demand function that ignores addiction.
Table 11 and Table 12 contain structural rational addiction demand functions for 
the probability of frequent drinking. This probability is directly related to past 
and future consumption. Two approaches are taken to measure past and future 
consumption. The variables in Table 11 (past percentage high and future 
percentage high) are based on the response to the question: "On the occasions 
that you drink alcoholic beverages, how often do you drink enough to feel pretty 
high?" The response categories are none of the occasions, few of the occasions, 
half of the occasions, most of the occasions, and nearly all of the occasions. 
Previously, we used these categories to estimate the number of drinks on a 
typical drinking occasion by assuming that 4 drinks m ust be consumed to feel 
pretty high. Here we simply scale them as 0 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 
percent, and 100 percent. This is a more flexible indicator than our estimate of 
the num ber of drinks consumed on a typical drinking occasion because it makes 
no assumption about the number of drinks required to feel pretty high. 
Moreover, it is reported and measured independently of drinking frequency. 
Past percentage high (the second lag of the scaled variable just defined) has a 
weighted mean of 32 percent and future percentage high (the second lead) has a 
weighted m ean of 28 percent.
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The disadvantage of the estimates in Table 11 is that they cannot be used to 
compute long-run participation price elasticities — elasticities which can be 
compared to those that ignore addiction. Therefore, in Table 12 we use the past 
and future probabilities of frequent drinking (or dichotomous indicators in the 
OLS models) as measures of past and future consumption. Taken together, the 
estimates in Table 11 and Table 12 can be viewed as first-order approximations to 
structural demand functions for participation in an addictive behavior. Past and 
future consumption are endogenous in the TSLS regressions. The instruments 
are the same as in that section.
Regardless of whether the demand functions are obtained by TSLS or by OLS, 
the estimated effects of past and future percentage high on the probability of 
current participation in frequent drinking are significantly positive in Table 11, 
and the price and legal drinking age effects are significantly negative. Similar 
results emerge from Table 12, except that the price coefficient is significant a t the 
10 percent level on a one-tailed test but not at the 5 percent level in columns 2 
and 4. The long-run price elasticity of participation in frequent drinking is -1.18 
in the first regression in Table 12, -0.27 in the second regression, -0.63 in the third, 
and -0.32 in the fourth. The average elasticity of -0.60 is approximately twice as 
large as the elasticity that ignores addiction of -0.33. These findings provide
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rather strong support for the rational addiction approach to participation in 
frequent drinking.
VI.C. Starting and Quitting Frequent and Heavy Drinking 
Behavior
In this section the determinants of starting and quitting frequent and heavy 
drinking behaviors are examined. Frequent drinking is defined as having had 
forty or more drinking occasions during the past 12 months and heavy drinking 
is defined as drinking enough to feel pretty high on at least half of all drinking 
occasions. The start sample consist of only those respondents who never 
engaged in the behaviors described at the baseline and quit sample consist of 
those who were engaged in such behavior at the baseline or started the behavior 
in one of the follow-ups. I am  focusing on first-time starts or quits. Hence, once 
the behavior starts the respondent's following records are dropped from the data 
set. Similarly once a person quits the behavior at issue, his or her later 
observations are deleted. The regression equations are in the form of discrete­
time hazard functions (for example, Allison 1982) in which the hazard (the 
conditional probability of starting or quitting in period t) is specified as a linear 
probability equation.
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Note that the above data sets are smaller than the ones used in previous sections 
and this makes it more difficult to find the significant relationships in this 
section's regressions. Allison (1984) and Heckman and Singer (1984) explain that 
the duration effects are biased in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. In 
the data set, the duration is highly correlated w ith age and I do not attem pt to 
find out the separate impacts of age, duration and heterogeneity. Therefore, a 
measure of duration is omitted from the hazard function.
Table 13 and Table 14 present the reduced form regressions of the probabilities of 
starting frequent and heavy drinking, respectively. Table 15 and Table 16 are for 
the structural demand functions in the context of rational addiction for these two 
behaviors. Future consumption in Table 15 is measured by the percentage of 
times the respondent got high, and the number of drinking occasions in Table 16. 
Since the past the start decision does not depend on past consumption, past 
variables are not used in the first stage of the TSLS regressions for these models. 
The mean start probability is 0.16 for frequent drinking, and 0.14 for heavy 
drinking.
The last four tables pertain to the probability of stopping frequent or heavy 
drinking behavior. As with the starting behavior regressions, the first two 
present the reduced form functions and the last two contain the structural 
rational addiction demand functions. In this case, the past variables as well as
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the future variables will affect quitting probability. The past and future 
consumption variables are the percentage high for Table 19 and num ber of 
drinking occasions for Table 20. The mean quit probability is 0.29 for frequent 
drinkers and 0.41 for heavy drinkers.
As predicted by the rational addiction model, the start probabilities are 
positively related to the future consumption. In seven of eight cases these effects 
are significant at one percent level. The rational addiction model predicts that 
the future consumption will have a negative effect on the quit probability. This 
is the result of the regressions in the last two tables, and five of the eight 
coefficients are significant. The past consumption effect is not strong (five 
coefficients have the correct, negative sign, of which only three are statistically 
significant).
Fourteen of the sixteen current price coefficients have the correct negative sign in 
the starting probability regressions, and fifteen of the sixteen price coefficients 
are correctly positive in quit regressions. But only a few of them  are statistically 
significant. Although none of them  statistically significant, the future price 
coefficients in the start regressions have the correct negative sign, and three of 
the four future price coefficients in quit regressions are correctly positive. Two of 
the four past price coefficients have the correct positive sign but they are not 
significant.
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Since the key coefficients have the correct signs and the future consumption 
coefficients are significant, these results support the rational addiction model. 
But this support is not very strong. But as mentioned in the first paragraph of 
this section, this may be attributed to the smaller size of the samples employed, 
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1 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
2 1977 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
3 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
4 1978 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
5 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
6 1979 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
7 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
8 1980 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
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10 1981 1982 1984 1986 1988
11 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
12 1982 1983 1985 1987 1989
13 1982 1984 1986 1988
14 1983 1984 1986 1988
15 1983 1985 1987 1989
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Annual number of drinks 60.630 49.210 Number of alcoholic drinks in the 
past year41
Price 2.789 0.282 Real annual beer price42
Legal drinking age*ageS21 11.992 8.405 Minimum legal age for purchase 
and consumption of alcohol, 
multiplied by dichotomous variable 
to indicate that age S2141
Lower border drinking age*age£21 0.096 0.257 Dichotomous variable that is equal 
to one if the respondent is less than 
21 years of age and resides within 
25 miles of a state with lower legal 
drinking age41
Male 0.449 0.433 Dichotomous variable for gender
Black 0.094 0.254 Dichotomous variable for African- 
Americans
Other race/ethnicity 0.070 0.223 Dichotomous variable for 
race/ethnicity other than African- 
Americans and whites
Real earnings 8417.570 6194.360 Real earnings (money earnings 
divided by cost of living index 
described in footnote 25)
Years of schooling 13.504 1.372 Years of schooling competed
Full-time college student 0.296 0.396 Dichotomous variables indicating
Half-time college student 0.038 0.165 the educational status of the
Less than half-time college student 0.054 0.196 respondent at the survey time
(continued)
41 See Section IV.C. for more details.






Working full-time 0.566 0.425 Dichotomous variables for
Working part-time 0.201 0.343 employment status of the
Unemployment 0.030 0.145 respondent at the survey time
Infrequent religious participation 0.426 0.429 Dichotomous variables for religious
Frequent religious participation 0.465 0.433 participation
Married 0.292 0.396 Dichotomous variables for marital
Engaged 0.084 0.242 status
Separated/ divorced 0.028 0.144
Number of children 0.270 0.540 Respondent's number of children
Age 19 0.333 0.411 Dichotomous variables indicating
Age 21 0.276 0.390 the age of the respondent
Age 23 0.199 0.348
Age 25 0.131 0.293
Class of 1976 0.155 0.315 Dichotomous variables indicating
Class of 1977 0.167 0.325 the year of the baseline survey that
Class of 1978 0.141 0.303 the respondent participated
Class of 1979 0.135 0.298
Class of 1980 0.104 0.266
Class of 1981 0.097 0.258
Class of 1982 0.069 0.221
Class of 1983 0.066 0.216
Class of 1984 0.034 0.158









Legal drinking age*age £ 21 -1.106 -1.217
(2.55) (2.92)
Lower border drinking age indicator*age £ 21 7.789 7.323
(5.73) (5.61)
Age 19 39.832 30.987
(4.68) (3.78)
Age 21 38.513 32.121
(4.47) (3.88)
Age 23 11.985 6.357
(6.31) (3.44)






Other race/ethnicity -13.818 -14.281
(9.39) (10.12)
Real earnings 0.00027 0.00043
(3.79) (6.38)
Years of completed schooling 1.606 0.850
(5.46) (2.88)
Full-time college student 8.358 3.948
(6.82) (3.31)
Half-time college student 1.982 -1.316
(0.95) (0.66)






Working full-time 6.734 1.525
(5.52) (1.27)




Infrequent religious participation -1.544
(1.31)






Separated or divorced 6.329
(2.84)
Number of children -3.264
(4.45)
R-squared 0.104 0.176
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for




Dependent Variable = Annual Number of Drinks
(n = 18,473)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past consumption 0.254 0.274 0.346 0.338
(4.37) (8.18) (60.07) (58.69)
Future consumption 0.656 0.345 0.474 0.454
(9.12) (11.14) (76.30) (72.60)
Price -2.470 -2.155 -2.663 -1.744
(2.40) (2.24) (2.84) (1.87)
Legal drinking age+age £ 21 -1.038 -1.131 -1.015 -1.059
(3.12) (3.44) (3.14) (3.30)
Lower border drinking age 1.597 3.379 2.139 2.203
indicator*age i  21 (1.42) (3.24) (2.12) (2.21)
Age 19 23.748 26.317 26.838 23.548
(3.55) (4.07) (4.24) (3.74)
Age 21 24.748 26.672 26.258 24.113
(3.70) (4.08) (4.09) (3.78)
Age 23 1.738 2.490 3.256 1.362
(1.04) (1.67) (2.27) (0.94)
Age 25 2.885 3.148 3.544 2.675
(1.86) (2.10) (2.41) (1.83)
Male 1.495 7.521 4.384 3.596
(0.80) (8.03) (7.13) (5.86)
Black -5.205 -13.157 -7.178 -8.032
(2.25) (8.66) (6.29) (6.99)
Other race/ethnicity -2.672 -6.599 -3.965 -4.431
(1.90) (5.42) (3.48) (3.92)
Real earnings 0.0001 0.00023 0.0001 0.00017
(1.83) (4.09) (1.93) (3.21)
Years of completed schooling 0.590 0.455 0.680 0.320
(2.45) (1.94) (3.10) (1.41)
Full-time college student 1.613 2.218 3.468 1.599
(1.36) (2.29) (3.81) (1.75)
Half-time college student -0.164 -0.762 0.418 -0.951
(0.10) (0.48) (0.27) (0.62)
Less than half-time college -1.582 -1.978 -1.101 -2.088




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time 2.742 1.334 3.055 1.040
(2.74) (1.41) (3.36) (1.13)
Working part-time 1.390 0.294 1.420 0.474
(1.49) (0.32) (1.56) (0.52)
Unemployed 0.701 -0.226 1.182 -0.982
(0.36) (0.12) (0.65) (0.54)
Infrequent religious -0.297 0.0024
participation (0.32) (0.003)






Separated or divorced 6.712 6.900
(3.68) (3.89)
Number of children -1.932 -1.538
(3.15) (2.66)
R-squared 0.191 0.292 0.568 0.576
Wu F-rado 3.417 16.945 —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and 
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for 
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 5
Structural Demand Functions, Discount Factor of 0.95 Imposed,
Dependent Variable = Annual Number of Drinks
(n = 18,473)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past consumption 0.436 0.320 0.416 0.402
(13.85) (19.55) (139.58) (131.13)
Future consumption 0.415 0.304 0.395 0.382
(13.85) (19.55) (139.58) (131.13)
Price -2.293 -2.034 -2.529 -1.599
(2.27) (2.12) (2.68) (1.71)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 -0.972 -1.110 -0.988 -1.034
(2.98) (3.38) (3.04) (3.21)
Lower border drinking age 1.854 3.312 2.141 2.210
indicator*age 5 21 (1.67) (3.17) (2.11) (2.20)
Age 19 26.709 26.657 27.605 24.319
(4.09) (4.12) (4.33) (3.84)
Age 21 25.410 26.564 26.237 24.185
(3.86) (4.06) (4.07) (3.78)
Age 23 3.199 2.695 3.636 1.777
(2.01) (1.81) (2.52) (1.22)
Age 25 3.474 3.242 3.686 2.860
(2.29) (2.17) (2.50) (1.95)
Male 3.851 7.551 4.892 4.003
(2.23) (8.05) (7.93) (6.50)
Black -5.694 -12.831 -6.962 -8.010
(2.51) (8.50) (6.07) (6.94)
Other race/ethnicity -3.722 -6.619 -4.190 -4.661
(2.75) (5.43) (3.66) (4.11)
Real earnings 0.000086 0.00022 0.000094 0.00017
(1.55) (3.99) (1.76) (3.14)
Years of completed schooling 0.619 0.450 0.674 0.326
(2.61) (1.92) (3.05) (1.42)
Full-time college student 4.057 2.592 4.263 2.222
- (4.19) (2.76) (4.67) (2.42)
Half-time college student 0.487 -0.696 0.609 -0.834
(0.31) (0.44) (0.39) (0.54)
Less than half-time college -0.998 -1.911 -0.920 -1.976




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time 2.756 1.291 2.989 1.003
(2.80) (1.36) (3.27) (1.08)
Working part-time 1.371 0.306 1.403 0.477
(1.49) (0.33) (1.53) (0.52)
Unemployed 0.711 -0.346 1.074 -1.094
(0.37) (0.19) (0.59) (0.60)
Infrequent religious -0.171 0.166
participation (0.18) (0.18)






Separated or divorced 7.029 7.364
(3.87) (4.14)
Number of children -1.714 -1.245
(2.86) (2.15)
R-squared 0.196 0.291 0.563 0.572
Wu F-ratio 0.420 26.996 —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 6
Structural Dem and Functions, Depreciation Rate = 1, 
D ependent Variable = Annual N um ber of D rinks, 
A dditional Leads and Lags of Price Employed as Instrum ents
(n = 17,667)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past consumption 0.245 0.265 0.347 0.338
(4.19) (7.58) (58.75) (57.41)
Future consumption 0.633 0.345 0.472 0.453
(9.27) (10.84) (74.10) (70.58)
Price -2.912 -2.379 -2.910 -2.025
(2.84) (2.44) (3.05) (2.14)
Legal drinking age*age 5 21 -0.944 -0.986 -0.916 -0.956
(2.79) (2.92) (2.76) (2.90)
Lower border drinking age 1.640 3.224 2.000 2.025
indicator*age £ 21 (1.42) (2.96) (1.90) (1.94)
Age 19 22.664 23.584 25.068 21.662
(3.36) (3.55) (3.85) (3.35)
Age 21 23.306 23.763 24.252 22.017
_ (3-44) (3.54) (3.68) (3.36)
Age 23 2.047 2.413 3.173 1.348
(1.24) (1.59) (2.17) (0.92)
Age 25 3.166 3.255 3.673 2.812
(2.03) (2.14) (2.46) (1.90)
Male 2.198 7.665 4.300 3.546
(1.22) (7.93) (6.83) (5.64)
Black -5.817 -13.052 -6.845 -7.643
(2.55) (8.35) (5.88) (6.52)
Other race/ethnicity -3.257 -6.744 -4.082 -4.564
(2.35) (5.43) (3.51) (3.96)
Real earnings 0.00011 0.00023 0.00011 0.00017
(1.9 7) (4.12) (2.00) (3.22)
Years of completed schooling 0.615 0.431 0.665 0.283
(2.50) (1.80) (2.96) (1.22)
Full-time college student 2.145 2.586 3.806 1.929
(1.81) (2.60) (4.09) (2.06)
Half-time college student 0.416 -0.368 0.909 -0.509
(0.25) (0.23) (0.57) (0.32)
Less than half-time college -1.324 -1.836 -0.923 -1.944




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time 3.174 1.617 3.347 1.246
(3.10) (1.66) (3.59) (1.32)
Working part-time 1.648 0.500 1.675 0.678
(1.73) (0.53) (1.80) (0.73)
Unemployed 1.460 0.277 1.569 -0.656
(0.73) (0.14) (0.84) (0.35)
Infrequent religious -0.527 -0.218
participation (0.55) (0.23)






Separated or divorced 7.108 7.444
(3.80) (4.10)
Number of children -2.150 -1.679
(3.42) (2.85)
R-squared 0.194 0.291 0.568 0.576
Wu F-ratio 3.086 17.340 — —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 7
Structural Demand Functions, Depreciation Rate = 0.8,
Dependent Variable = Annual Number of Drinks
(n = 17,053)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock 0.255 0.250 0.328 0.321
(4.85) (8.00) (59.65) (58.31)
Future consumption 0.588 0.339 0.464 0.445
(8.53) (10.81) (71.53) (68.03)
Price -3.546 -2.614 -3.271 -2.746
. . . .  (2,45) (1.80) (2.30) (1.95)
Future price 1.266 0.967 1.009 1.588
(0.88) (0.69) (0.74) (1.17)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 -1.065 -1.176 -1.042 -1.089
(3.22) (3.54) (3.20) (3.37)
Lower border drinking age 1.773 3.363 2.036 2.085
indicator*age £ 21 (1.57) (3.19) (2.01) (2.08)
Age 19 28.924 29.995 32.021 28.577
(4.31) (4.55) (4.99) (4.47)
Age 21 26.541 27.888 27.678 25.527
(3.9 7) (4.20) (4.26) (3.95)
Age 23 1.721 1.802 2.784 0.794
(0,?5) (1.07) (1.73) (0.49)
Age 25 2.212 2.442 2.761 1.913
(1.27) (1.43) (1.66) (1.16)
Male 2.473 7.354 4.025 3.187
(1.31) (7.64) (6.33) (5.02)
Black -6.461 -13.696 -7.152 -8.017
(2.63) (8.41) (5.79) (6.46)
Other race/ethnicity -3.166 -6.754 -3.845 -4.320
(2.15) (5.21) (3.18) (3.61)
Real earnings 0.000093 0.0002 0.00008 0.00015
(1.58) (3.44) (1.42) (2.60)
Years of completed schooling 0.614 0.362 0.646 0.276
(2.50) (1.46) (2.77) (1.14)
Full-time college student 2.555 2.525 3.831 1.861
(2.15) (2.53) (4.10) (1.98)
Half-time college student 0.363 -0.215 0.784 -0.594
(0.22) (0.13) (0.49) (0.37)
Less than half-time college -0.774 -1.676 -0.496 -1.613




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time 2.783 1.129 2.832 0.826
(2.70) (1.14) (3.00) (0.86)
Working part-time 1.305 0.049 1.260 0.310
(1.39) (0.052) (1.36) (0.33)
Unemployed 1.704 0.525 1.797 -0.494
(0.83) (0.27) (0.94) (0.26)
Infrequent religious -0.142 0.209
participation (0.15) (0.22)






Separated or divorced 7.195 7.293
(3.66) (3.83)
Number of children -2.277 -1.672
(3.30) (2.62)
R-squared 0.191 0.289 0.572 0.580
Wu F-ratio 1.845 18.306 —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 8 
Price Elasticities of Demand
Based on Table 4
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) ...  0 ) (4)
Long run -1.265 -0.260 -0.681 -0.386
Short run -0.857 -0.181 -0.384 -0.225
Temporary current -0.144 - 0.111 -0.154 -0.099
Temporary past -0.046 -0.034 -0.067 -0.041
Temporary future -0.120 -0.043 -0.092 -0.056
Table 9
Price and Consum ption Coefficients, 













Long-run price elasticity -0.54
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and 




Reduced Form Demand Functions,






Legal drinking age*age £ 21 -0.011 -0.012
(2.96) (3.27)
Lower border drinking age 0.036 0.033
indicator*age S 21 (3.22) (3.02)
Age 19 0.304 0.240
(4.28) (3.46)
Age 21 0.313 0.267
(4.36) (3.82)
Age 23 0.076 0.036
(4.83) (2.30)






Other race/ethnicity -0.089 -0.092
(7.26) (7.70)
Real earnings 0.000003 0.0000041
(5.07) (7.12)
Years of completed schooling 0.018 0.012
(7.25) (4.75)
Full-time college student 0.042 0.011
(4.08) (1.07)
Half-time college student 0.0033 -0.020
(0.19) (1.16)






























Separated or divorced 0.032
(1.71)
Number of children -0.025
(4.08)
R-squared 0.0917 0.1381
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for




Dependent Variable = Probability of Forty or More Annual Drinking
Occasions
(n = 19,145)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past percentage high 0.0042 0.0042 0.0039 0.0037
(2.17) (4.27) (31.52) (29.82)
Future percentage high 0.012 0.0048 0.0037 0.0033
(3.98) (4.81) (26.15) (23.45)
Price -0.025 -0.023 -0.038 -0.024
(1.99) (2.28) (3.72) (2.36)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014
(3.19) (3.87) (3.72) (3.90)
Lower border drinking age -0.00062 0.015 0.020 0.019
indicator*age 5 21 (0.043) (1.31) (1.82) (1.78)
Age 19 0.209 0.219 0.290 0.232
(2.54) (3.15) (4.18) (3.38)
Age 21 0.258 0.270 0.319 0.278
(3.17) (3.84) (4.54) (4.01)
Age 23 0.0053 0.0093 0.049 0.016
(0.24) (0.57) (3.08) (1.02)
Age 25 0.0091 0.013 0.032 0.016
(0.47) (0.82) (1.97) (1.02)
Male 0.065 0.115 0.145 0.130
(2.35) (12.14) (21.84) (19.53)
Black -0.042 -0.115 -0.133 -0.136
(1.20) (7.16) (10.88) (11.12)
Other race/ethnicity -0.014 -0.052 -0.058 -0.062
(0.68) (3.95) (4.68) (5.08)
Real earnings 0.0000047 0.0000047 0.0000039 0.0000046
(6.72) (8.09) (6.72) (7.98)
Years of completed schooling 0.030 0.017 0.023 0.016
(8.48) (6.73) (9.54) (6.46)
Full-time college student 0.031 0.013 0.040 0.013
(2.62) (1.29) (4.03) (1.30)
Half-time college student -0.0074 -0.018 0.0029 -0.017
(0.38) (1.06) (0.17) (1.01)
Less than half-time college 0.016 0.0022 0.014 0.0011




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares





















































R-squared 0.086 0.153 0.215 0.236
Wu F-ratio 5.887 2.685 —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 12
Structural Demand Functions, 
D ependent Variable = Probability of Forty or More Annual D rinking 
Occasions, 
Past and Future Probabilities Included
(n = 18,579)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past probability 0.199 0.252 0.326 0.317
(2.21) (5.18) (49.93) (48.45)
Future probability 0.651 0.348 0.402 0.387
(6.59) (8.34) (62.57) (59.93)
Price -0.021 -0.013 -0.020 -0.011
(2.06) (1.46) (2.24) (1.26)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010
(3.13) (3.56) (3.19) (3.38)
Lower border drinking age 0.0044 0.014 0.010 0.010
indicator*age £ 21 (0.42) (1.43) (1.06) (1.06)
Age 19 0.224 0.236 0.252 0.226
(3.47) (3.87) (4.17) (3.74)
Age 21 0.240 0.247 0.250 0.233
(3.66) (4.01) (4.0 7) (3.82)
Age 23 0.020 0.016 0.031 0.014
(1.30) (1.18) (2.24) (0.99)
Age 25 0.019 0.015 0.021 0.013
(1.29) (1.09) (1.52) (0.96)
Male 0.023 0.069 0.059 0.051
(1.18) (7.00) (10.08) (8.65)
Black -0.048 -0.095 -0.070 -0.075
(2.35) (6.82) (6.48) (6.82)
Other race/ethnicity -0.027 -0.051 -0.041 -0.044
(2.03) (4.50) (3.73) (4.05)
Real earnings 0.0000013 0.0000021 0.0000012 0.0000018
(2.19) (3.96) (2.34) (3.48)
Years of completed schooling 0.0057 0.0065 0.0085 0.0058
(2.24) (2.91) (4.06) (2.65)
Full-time college student -0.0069 -0.0049 0.0093 -0.0058
(0.62) (0.54) (1.07) (0.67)
Half-time college student -0.0087 -0.014 -0.003 -0.014
(0.56) (0.94) (0.20) (0.97)
Less than half-time college -0.0037 -0.005 0.0023 -0.0055




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time 0.018 0.009 0.024 0.0079
(1.82) (101) (2.77) (0.89)
Working part-time 0.0019 -0.0022 0.005 -0.0023
(0.20) (0.25) (0.58) (0.26)
Unemployed 0.023 0.015 0.031 0.013
(1.21) (0.85) (1.76) (0.72)
Infrequent religious -0.010 -0.0079
participation (1.10) (0.91)






Separated or divorced 0.041 0.042
(2.37) (2.49)
Number of children -0.014 -0.011
(2.37) (1.9 7)
R-squared 0.128 0.197 0.425 0.433
Wu F-rado 3.468 2.809 — —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and 
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for 
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 13
Reduced Form Demand Functions,
Dependent Variable = Probability of Starting Forty or More Annual Drinking
Occasions
(n = 10,669)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price -0.020 -0.0044 -0.0078 -0.00072
0-67) (0.37) (0.45) (0.042)
Future price • -0.016 -0.0048
(0.98) (0.29)
Legal drinking age*age S 21 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013
(3.14) (3.4 7) (3.08) (3.46)
Lower border drinking age 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015
indicator*age £ 21 (1.19) (1.26) (1.23) (1.27)
Age 19 0.444 0.422 0.441 0.421
(5.95) (5.68) (5.90) (5.67)
Age 21 0.363 0.353 0.360 0.352
(4.81) (4.71) .. (4.76) (4.70)
Age 23 0.081 0.062 0.082 0.062
(3.50) (2.68) (3.54) (2.69)
Age 25 0.045 0.037 0.046 0.037
(1.86) (1.53) (1.89) (1.54)
Male 0.094 0.076 0.094 0.077
(12.17) (9.83) (12.17) (9.83)
Black -0.115 -0.122 -0.115 -0.122
(9.55) (10.02) (9.56) (10.03)
Other race/ethnicity -0.066 -0.072 -0.067 -0.072
(4.80) (5.27) (4.84) (5.28) •
Real earnings 0.000001 0.0000017 0.000001 0.0000017
(1.33) (2.25) (1.30) (2.24)
Years of completed schooling 0.0089 0.0072 0.0089 0.0072
(2.86) (2.21) (2.83) (2.21)
Full-time college student 0.038 0.018 0.037 0.018
(3.40) (1.61) (3.38) (1.60)
Half-time college student^ 0.0075 -0.0038 0.0071 -0.0039
(0.38) (0.19) (0.36) (0.20)
Less than half-time college 0.0018 -0.010 0.0015 -0.010

























































R-squared 0.0596 0.0817 0.0597 0.0817
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic t-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 14
Reduced Form Demand Functions,
Dependent Variable = Probability of Starting to Get High on at Least Half of
all Annual Drinking Occasions
(n = 8,404)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price -0.018 -0.0046 -0.0082 -0.001
(1.41) (0.36) (0.45) (0.058)
Future price -0.013 -0.0048
(0.74) (0.28)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 0.0012 0.00045 0.0014 0.0005
(0.30) (0.11) (0.34) (0.13)
Lower border drinking age 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020
indicator*age £ 21 (1.57) (1.53) (1.60) (1.54)
Age 19 0.158 0.153 0.155 0.152
(2.00) (1.93) (1.96) (1.92)
Age 21 0.062 0.063 0.059 0.062
(0.77) (0.79) (0.73) (0.77)
Age 23 0.038 0.032 0.039 0.032
(1.69) (1.41) (1.73) (1.42)
Age 25 0.021 0.018 0.021 0.019
(0.88) (0-79) (0.91) (0.80)
Male 0.047 0.034 0.047 0.034
(5.72) (4.15) (5.73) (4.15)
Black -0.080 -0.082 -0.081 -0.082
(6.72) (6.71) (6.74) (6.72)
Other race/ethnicity -0.053 -0.057 -0.053 -0.058
(3.73) (4.09) (3.76) (4.10)
Real earnings -0.0000013 -0.000001 -0.0000013 -0.000001
(1.74) (1.33) (1.77) (1.34)
Years of completed schooling -0.00074 -0.0011 -0.00081 -0.0011
(0-24) (0.32) (0.26) (0.33)
Full-time college student 0.022 0.015 0.021 0.015
(1.85) (1.23) (1.83) (1.22)
Half-time college student -0.012 -0.018 -0.013 -0.019
(0.59) (0.89) (0.60) (0.89)
Less than half-time college -0.0027 -0.0061 -0.003 -0.0063

























































R-squared 0.0542 0.0683 0.0543 0.0683
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for




Dependent Variable = Probability of Starting Forty or More Annual Drinking
Occasions
(n = 10,164)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Future percentage high 0.0092 0.0052 0.0041 0.0038
(2.50) (5.29) (26.48) (24.14)
Price -0.0046 -0.0026 -0.014 -0.0035
(0.32) (0.21) (1.17) (0.29)
Legal drinking age*age S 21 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(3.36) (3.56) (3.34) (3.54)
Lower border drinking age -0.0063 0.0033 0.0051 0.0065
indicator*age £ 21 (0.43) (0.27) (0.44) (0.56)
Age 19 0.357 0.370 0.409 0.385
(4.06) (4.85) (5.44) (5.12)
Age 21 0.325 0.332 0.354 0.341
(3.92) (4.34) (4.65) (4.49)
Age 23 0.029 0.038 0.061 0.045
(0.87) (1.55) (2.60) (1.93)
Age 25 0.013 0.022 0.032 0.026
(0.43) (0.87) (1.31) (1.08)
Male 0.043 0.055 0.075 0.062
(1.81) (6.00) (9.43) (7.81)
Black -0.038 -0.078 -0.080 -0.090
(1.13) (5.17) (6.33) (7.03)
Other race/ethnicity -0.029 -0.047 -0.048 -0.054
(1.42) (3.21) (3.41) (3.79)
Real earnings 0.0000023 0.0000022 0.0000016 0.0000021
(2.39) (2.88) (2.05) (2.75)
Years of completed schooling 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.010
(3.79) (3.17) (4.03) (2.97)
Full-time college student 0.029 0.015 0.033 0.015
(2.38) (1.29) (2.94) (1.33)
Half-time college student 0.005 -0.0042 0.0064 -0.0039
(0.24) (0.21) (0.32) (0.20)
Less than half-time college 0.012 -0.0031 0.0061 -0.0056




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares





















































R-squared 0.057 0.087 0.119 0.131
Wu F-ratio 2.131 2.096 — —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for




Dependent Variable = Probability of Starting to Get High on at Least Half of
all Annual Drinking Occasions
(n = 7,859)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Future frequency of drinking 0.003 0.0043 0.0048 0.0045
occasions (1.39) (3.6 7) (22.02) (20.28)
Price -0.010 0.0038 -0.0041 0.0041
(0.68) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 0.0026 0.0023 0.003 0.0023
(0.64) (0.56) (0.72) (0.57)
Lower border drinking age 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016
indicator*age £ 21 (1.35) (1.21) (1.20) (1.20)
Age 19 0.104 0.086 0.077 0.083
(1.18) (1.03) (0.94) (1.02)
Age 21 0.023 0.014 0.003 0.012
(0.26) (0.16) (0.037) (0.14)
Age 23 0.026 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.98) (0.64) (0.66) (0.62)
Age 25 0.015 0.0092 0.010 0.0088
(0.59) (0.38) (0.40) (0.36)
Male 0.034 0.016 0.022 0.015
(2.16) (1.56) (2.62) (1.78)
Black -0.053 -0.042 -0.037 -0.041
(2.37) (2.56) (2.87) (3.08)
Other race/ethnicity -0.041 -0.039 -0.034 - -0.039
(2.45) (2.53) (2.32) (2.61)
Real earnings -0.0000021 -0.0000021 -0.0000024 -0.0000021
(2.38) (2.55) (3.07) (2.72)
Years of completed schooling -0.0041 -0.0052 -0.0062 -0.0054
(1.01) (1.45) (1.88) (1.57)
Full-time college student 0.005 -0.0039 -0.0041 -0.0046
(0.31) (0.30) (0.34) (0.37)
Half-time college student -0.020 -0.024 -0.023 -0.025
(0.89) (1.13) (1.08) (1.14)
Less than half-time college -0.0077 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time 0.0069 0.0023 0.003 0.0022
(0.53) (0.18) (0.25) (0.17)
Working part-time 0.0046 0.002 0.0039 0.002
(0.38) (0.17) (0.33) (0.17)
Unemployed 0.053 0.045 0.053 0.046
(2.05) (1.75) (2.05) (1.77)
Infrequent religious 0.006 0.0057
participation (0.40) (0.38)






Separated or divorced -0.027 -0.028
(1.01) (1.06)
Number of children 0.011 0.011
(1.28) (1.31)
R-squared 0.056 0.073 0.108 0.115
Wu F-ratio 0.769 0.027 — —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 17
Reduced Form Demand Functions,
Dependent Variable = Probability of Quitting Forty or More Annual Drinking
Occasions
(n = 5,355)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past price 0.035 0.032
(1.13) (1.06)
Price 0.022 0.010 0.015 0.011
(1.10) (0.54) (0.45) (0.34)
Future price -0.024 -0.032
(0.88) (1.17)
Legal drinking age*age ^ 21 0.0044 0.0051 0.0056 0.0064
(0.63) (0.73) (0.79) (0.91)
Lower border drinking age -0.044 -0.040 -0.043 -0.039
indicator*age £ 21 (2.11) (1.94) (2.04) (1.88)
Age 19 -0.018 0.024 -0.052 -0.010
(0.13) (0.17) (0.37) (0.076)
Age 21 -0.067 -0.035 -0.098 -0.067
(0.48) (0.26) (0.69) (0.48)
Age 23 0.0014 0.036 -0.0024 0.034
(0.042) (1.H) (0.072) (1.02)
Age 25 0.0029 0.021 0.003 0.021
(0.086) (0.62) (0.088) (0.64)
Male -0.160 -0.145 -0.160 -0.145
(12.86) (11.64) (12.86) (11.63)
Black 0.096 0.097 0.094 0.096
(2.43) (2.48) (2.40) (2.44)
Other race/ethnicity 0.083 0.082 0.083 0.082
(3.08) (3.07) (3.10) (3.08)
Real earnings -0.000000015 -0.0000013 -0.00000007 5 -0.0000014
(0.015) (1.28) (0.071) (1.35)
Years of completed schooling -0.015 -0.010 -0.015 -0.010
(3.29) (2.19) (3.33) (2.24)
Full-time college student -0.053 -0.036 -0.053 -0.036
(2.64) (1.79) (2.64) (1.79)
Half-time college student -0.033 -0.015 -0.034 -0.016
(1.05) (0.49) (1.06) (0.50)
Less than half-time college -0.040 -0.030 -0.039 -0.030




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time -0.047 -0.032 -0.047 -0.032
(2.28) (1.54) (2.28) (1.55)
Working part-time -0.019 -0.013 -0.019 -0.013
(0.94) (0.63) (0.94) (0.63)
Unemployed -0.026 -0.0041 -0.025 -0.0032
(0.64) (0.10) (0.62) (0.079)
Infrequent religious 0.012 0.012
participation (0.69) (0.73)
Frequent religious 0.079 0.080





Separated or divorced -0.044 -0.042
(1,07) (1.04)
Number of children 0.036 0.036
(2.37) (2.37)
R-squared 0.0499 0.0765 0.0503 0.0769
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 18
Reduced Form Demand Functions,
Dependent Variable = Probability of Quitting Getting High on at Least Half of
all Annual Drinking Occasions
(n = 6,775)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past price -0.044 -0.052
(1.43) (1.70)
Price 0.023 0.0084 0.049 0.044
(1.17) (0.43) (1.45) (1.31)
Future price 0.0056 -0.00038
(0.20) (0.014)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 0.008 0.0075 0.0072 0.0067
fl-30) (1.25) (1.16) (1.10)
Lower border drinking age -0.050 -0.047 -0.052 -0.048
indicator*age S 21 (2.78) (2.60) (2.86) (2.68)
Age 19 -0.057 -0.0053 -0.027 0.029
(0.46) (0.043) (0.21) (0.23)
Age 21 -0.092 -0.048 -0.065 -0.018
(0.74) (0.39) (0.51) (0.14)
Age 23 0.0058 0.038 0.012 0.046
(0.13) (0.88) (0.28) (1.05)
Age 25 -0.045 -0.024 -0.045 -0.023
(0.98) (0.54) (0.9 7) (0.52)
Male -0.127 -0.106 -0.127 -0.105
(10.45) (8.70) (10.44) (8.69)
Black 0.092 0.089 0.093 0.090
(2.98) (2.90) (3.02) (2.93)
Other race/ethnicity 0.047 0.041 0.046 0.039
(1.89) (1.67) (1.83) (1.59)
Real earnings 0.0000021 0.000001 0.0000021 0.000001
(1.69) (0.83) (1.72) (0.85)
Years of completed schooling 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.014
(2.14) (2.78) (2.15) (2.79)
Full-time college student -0.070 -0.043 -0.070 -0.043
(3.72) (2.30) (3.74) (2.31)
Half-time college student -0.040 -0.022 -0.041 -0.022
(1.29) (0.70) (1.30) (0.71)







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working full-time 0.020 0.039 0.020 0.040
(1.04) (2.01) (1.05) (2.02)
Working part-time -0.0029 0.006 -0.0032 0.0056
(0.16) (0.33) (0.17) (0.31)
Unemployed -0.021 -0.0021 -0.022 -0.0026
(0.59) (0.06) (0.60) (0.072)
Infrequent religious -0.0037 -0.0036
participation (0.21) (0.21)






Separated or divorced -0.078 -0.078
(1.78) (1.77)
Number of children 0.020 0.021
(1.28) (1.32)
R-squared 0.0302 0.054 0.0305 0.0544
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for




Dependent Variable = Probability of Quitting Forty or More Annual Drinking
Occasions
(n = 5,233)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past percentage high 0.005 0.0073 -0.00044 -0.0003
(1,54) (2.95) (1.69) (1.18)
Future percentage high -0.0027 -0.002 -0.0029 -0.0026
(0.82) (1.17) (10.58) (9.53)
Price 0.015 -0.0044 0.025 0.015
(0.69) (0.20) (1.25) (0.74)
Legal drinking age*age <, 21 0.0026 0.0026 0.0043 0.0049
(0.35) (0.34) (0.61) (0.71)
Lower border drinking age -0.054 -0.059 -0.035 -0.033
indicator*age ^ 21 (2.21) (2.43) (1.70) (1.57)
Age 19 -0.052 -0.024 -0.0042 0.033
(0.35) (0.16) (0.03) (0.25)
Age 21 -0.056 -0.019 -0.055 -0.026
(0.38) (0.12) (0.39) (0.19)
Age 23 -0.0077 0.024 0.014 0.046
(0.20) (0.63) (0.41) (1.3 7)
Age 25 -0.00057 0.018 0.007 0.024
(0.015) (0.49) (0.21) (0.71)
Male -0.167 -0.165 -0.138 -0.128
(6.57) (8.57) (10.93) (10.11)
Black 0.104 0.108 0.101 0.103
(2.35) (2.42) (2.50) (2.56)
Other race/ethnicity 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.075
(2.41) (2.46) (2.77) (2.79)
Real earnings 0.000001 0.0000002- -0.00000052 -0.0000016
(0.73) (0.17) (0.50) (1.52)
Years of completed schooling -0.016 -0.0087 -0.019 -0.014
(2.73) (1.58) (4.21) (3.01)
Full-time college student -0.054 -0.036 -0.054 -0.037
(2.56) (1.64) (2.68) (1.83)
Half-time college student -0.030 -0.011 -0.029 -0.012
(0.87) (0.30) (0.89) (0.37)
Less than half-time college -0.044 -0.035 -0.044 -0.034




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) __ (4)
Working full-time -0.056 -0.036 -0.059 -0.043
(2.34) (1.53) (2.83) (2.06)
Working part-time -0.019 -0.0064 -0.028 -0.021
(0.84) (0.28) (1.40) (1.04)
Unemployed -0.046 -0.030 -0.027 -0.0069
(1.02) (0.65) (0.65) (0.17)
Infrequent religious 0.021 0.010
participation (1.10) (0.55)






Separated or divorced -0.0045 -0.051
(0.10) (1.23)
Number of children 0.034 0.036
(2-01) (2.35)
R-squared 0.047 0.066 0.075 0.095
Wu F-ratio 1.972 6.422 — —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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Table 20
Structural Demand Functions, Dependent Variable = Probability of Quitting
Getting High on at Least Half of all Annual Drinking Occasions
(n = 6,150)
Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2) _ (3) (4)
Past frequency of drinking -0.0036 0.0035 -0.0015 -0.0014
occasions (0.89) (1.41) (4.02) (3.67)
Future frequency of drinking -0.002 -0.0071 -0.0055 -0.005
occasions (0.70) (4.22) (15.29) (13.66)
Price 0.015 0.004 0.012 0.0026
(0.73) (0.20) (0.59) (0.13)
Legal drinking age*age £ 21 0.0057 0.0075 0.0057 0.0057
(0.89) (1.20) (0.94) (0.95)
Lower border drinking age -0.042 -0.042 -0.038 -0.038
indicator*age £ 21 (2.11) (2.22) (2.12) (2.11)
Age 19 -0.038 0.014 -0.015 0.012
(0.29) (0.12) (0.13) (0.094)
Age 21 -0.053 -0.041 -0.043 -0.021
(0.40) (0.32) (0.34) (0.17)
Age 23 0.012 0.045 0.020 0.039
(0.27) (1.00) (0.45) (0.89)
Age 25 -0.036 -0.018 -0.031 -0.019
(0.75) (0.37) (0.67) (0.41)
Male -0.092 -0.075 -0.075 -0.066
(2.98) (3.92) (6.03) (5.27)
Black 0.046 0.079 0.044 0.048
(0.90) (1.98) (1.36) (1.48)
Other race/ethnicity 0.039 0.027 0.029 0.027
(1.36) (1.04) (1.14) (1.08)
Real earnings 0.0000031 0.0000017 0.000003 0.0000022
(2.24) (1.28) (2.47) (1.79)
Years of completed schooling 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.017
(2.33) (3.12) (3.07) (3.33)
Full-time college student -0.052 -0.014 -0.037 -0.022
(2.29) (0.69) (1.99) (1.18)
Half-time college student -0.030 -0.019 -0.028 -0.016
(0.92) (0.61) (0.89) (0.53)
Less than half-time college 0.047 0.063 0.054 0.061




Two-Stage Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares





















































R-squared 0.031 0.056 0.079 0.091
Wu F-ratio 0.770 2.332 — —
Note: Absolute value of the asymptotic f-statistic is in parentheses, and
intercepts are not shown. Regressors include dichotomous variables for
nine of the ten cohorts (the senior classes of 1976 through 1984).
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